KNOP, MICHAELS & RILES 64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (DO NOT DELETE)

3/9/2012 5:18 PM

FROM MULTICULTURALISM
TO TECHNIQUE:
FEMINISM, CULTURE, AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS STYLE
Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles*
The German Chancellor, the French President, and the British Prime Minister have each grabbed world headlines with pronouncements that their states’
policies of multiculturalism have failed. As so often, domestic debates about multiculturalism, as well as foreign policy debates about human rights in nonWestern countries, revolve around the treatment of women. Yet feminists are no
longer even certain how to frame, let alone resolve, the issues raised by veiling,
polygamy, and other cultural practices oppressive to women by Western standards. Feminism has become perplexed by the very concept of “culture.” This
impasse is detrimental both to women’s equality and to concerns for cultural autonomy.

* Karen Knop, Professor of Law, University of Toronto. Ralf Michaels, Professor of
Law, Duke Law School. Annelise Riles, Jack G. Clarke Professor of Law in Far East Legal
Studies and Professor of Anthropology, Cornell University. For conversations, comments,
and critique, we thank Moritz Bälz, Roxana Banu, Katharine Bartlett, Sherry Colb, Jacques
deLisle, Deborah DeMott, Justin Desautels-Stein, Michael Dorf, Heidi Li Feldman, Janet
Halley, Gabriele Koziol, Bernadette Meyler, Randall Peerenboom, Nina Pillard, Jeff Rachlinski, Judith Resnik, Steve Shiffrin, Simon Stern, Lynn Stout, Mariana Valverde, and Dai
Yokomizo. We also thank participants in the University of Hong Kong conference “From
Economic Development to Human Flourishing”; the Cornell Law School Faculty Workshop;
the Duke Law School Faculty Workshop; the “Governance Feminism and Its Others” workshop sponsored by the University of Florida Law School and the Harvard Program for Social
Thought; the Georgetown Faculty Research Workshop; the 2011 panel of the Association of
American Law Schools Section on Comparative Law; the “Law, Culture and Development
in a Transnational Legal Environment” conference in Tokyo sponsored by Cornell University and the Maison Franco-Japonaise; the University of Sapporo School of Law Legal Studies
Workshop; the Public/Private International Law Colloquium, William S. Boyd School of
Law, University of Nevada; the Globalization, Law and Justice Workshop, Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto; and the PILAGG workshop series at Sciences Po. We owe special
thanks to the editors of the Stanford Law Review for their generous and incisive engagement
with our Article. Karen Knop acknowledges with gratitude the support of the Social Sciences
Research Council of Canada.

589

KNOP, MICHAELS & RILES 64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (DO NOT DELETE)

590

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

3/9/2012 5:18 PM

[Vol. 64:589

We propose shifting gears. Our approach draws on what, at first glance,
would seem to be an unpromising legal paradigm for feminism—the highly technical field of conflict of laws (conflicts). Using the nonintuitive hypothetical of a
dispute in California between a Japanese father and daughter over a transfer of
shares, we demonstrate the contribution that conflicts can make. Whereas Western feminists are often criticized for dwelling on “exotic” cultural practices to the
neglect of other important issues affecting the lives of women in those communities or states, our choice of this hypothetical not only joins the correctives, but also shows how economic issues, in fact, take us back to the same impasse. Even
mundane issues of corporate law prove to be dizzyingly indeterminate and complex in their feminist and cultural dimensions.
What makes conflict of laws a better way to recognize and do justice to the
different dimensions of our hypothetical, surprisingly, is viewing conflicts as
technique. More generally, conflicts can offer a new approach to the feminism/culture debate—if we treat its technicalities not as mere means to an end but
as an intellectual style. Trading the big picture typical of public law for the specificity and constraint of technical form provides a promising style of capturing,
revealing, and ultimately taking a stand on the complexities confronting feminists
as multiculturalism is challenged here and abroad.
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INTRODUCTION
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicholas Sarkozy,
and British Prime Minister David Cameron have each grabbed world headlines
of late with pronouncements that their states’ efforts to create a multicultural
society have failed. “Utterly failed,” according to Merkel in a speech to young
members of her party in October 2010, asserting that the onus should be on
immigrants to do more to integrate into German society.1 “Oui, c’est un échec,”
Sarkozy responded bluntly in a February 2011 televised exchange with voters2—puzzling those who noted that France has been relatively inflexible about
minorities’ cultural practices, banning headscarves in schools and preparing to
introduce a separate ban on face veils in all public places.3 In announcing he
would soon present new policies designed to strengthen Britain’s collective
identity, David Cameron was equally hard hitting:
State multiculturalism is a wrong-headed doctrine that has had disastrous
results.
....
Take forced marriages. In Bradford, where I was last week, schoolgirls under the age of sixteen have simply disappeared from school. Nobody knows
where they are.
And, until recently, there was little investigation—despite the fact that it is
likely that they may have been drugged, imprisoned, kidnapped and forced into an unwanted marriage on the other side of the world.4

1. Matthew Weaver, Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism Has “Utterly Failed,”
GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2010, 6:58 AM EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/
angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed.
2. Agence France-Presse, Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says French President,
DAILYMOTION (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xgzqs8_multiculturalism
-has-failed-says-french-president_news (“Yes, it’s a failure.”).
3. See Ruadhán Mac Cormaic, Sarkozy Denounces Multiculturalism as “a Failure,”
IR. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at 11, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/
2011/0212/1224289636274.html.
4. Andrew Sparrow, Cameron Attacks “State Multiculturalism,” GUARDIAN (Feb. 26,
2008, 10:58 AM EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/feb/26/conservatives.race.
In 2010, the British government’s Forced Marriages Unit gave advice or support related to a
possible forced marriage in 1735 cases. Forced Marriage, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH
OFF.,
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/when-things-go-wrong/forced
-marriage (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
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Headscarves, face veils, the British prime minister’s sensationalist example
of schoolgirls drugged and dragged off to a forced marriage in a backward
country—as so often, domestic debates about the limits of multiculturalism revolve around the treatment of women. Much the same is true of foreign policy
debates about human rights in non-Western countries. Consider, for example,
that an independent bipartisan U.S. federal government commission that monitors other countries’ compliance with the international human right to religious
freedom has emerged as a persistent critic of Islamic countries for their violations of women’s equality.5
In contrast to such political resolve, however, there seems to be widespread
if awkward agreement that Western academic feminism has become bogged
down in the problem of “culture.”6 By the problem of culture, we mean not that
actual cultures have proved resistant to efforts to further gender equality (although that is also the case), but that as understandings of the concept of culture have changed, it has become more and more complicated to frame, let
alone resolve, the issues raised by veiling, clitoridectomy, polygamy, and other
cultural practices considered oppressive to women by Western standards. Is the
question whether to give our commitment to gender equality precedence over
claims that a practice is fundamental to a culture—or is it actually a question of
competing cultures? Do Western feminists fail to recognize the choices made
by women in other cultures and, conversely, the cultural conditioning of their
own? What should we do when confronted with internal disagreements over
what is fundamental to another culture? And so on.
It is not a stretch to say that the much-noted brain drain from feminism is
partly due to the intellectual and ethical morass the “feminism/culture” debate
has become.7 “Everywhere I go,” Janet Halley has written, “women complain
to me that academic feminism has lost its zing. Many of the key intellectual
figures in feminism have decamped to other endeavors.”8 Indeed, Halley herself argues that feminists should “take a break from feminism.”9
As Martha Minow has put it, the debate over women and cultural accommodation has become a number of predictable moves in a game.10 In Part I of
5. See Karen Knop, International Law and the Disaggregated Democratic State: Two
Case Studies on Women’s Human Rights and the United States, in WE, THE PEOPLE(S):
PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE 75, 78 (Claire Charters & Dean R. Knight eds., 2011).
6. See, e.g., ANNE PHILLIPS, MULTICULTURALISM WITHOUT CULTURE 1 (2007).
7. We use the term “feminism/culture” to encompass the range of positions taken in
the debate and the term “feminism versus culture” to refer specifically to the position that
feminist values conflict with concerns for cultural autonomy. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 21.
8. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM 340 (2006).
9. See id. passim.
10. Martha Minow, About Women, About Culture: About Them, About Us, DAEDALUS,
Fall 2000, at 125, 129; see also id. at 134-35 (working through the iterations of the normative challenges to liberal feminists from culture defenders).
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this Article, we trace a succession of challenges for legal feminism caused by
developments in how culture is conceived, culminating with the postessentialist idea of culture as “invented tradition.” Along the way, we highlight
a number of important insights and fault lines that emerge from the feminism/culture debate and also several common strategies for resolving the issue.
In the subsequent Parts, we suggest a way to engage in the practical political work of feminism in an intellectually vibrant fashion and, in particular, a
way to both build on the insights of the feminism/culture debate and gain some
critical leverage on it rather than “take a break.” The path we propose draws on
an unlikely legal paradigm—conflict of laws. Conflict of laws is the part of private law that deals with cases having a foreign element. “Foreign element”
simply means a connection to some legal system other than that of the jurisdiction in which the case is being tried, the other jurisdiction being either a foreign
state or another subdivision of the same state. The contract in dispute might be
made with a foreign company, for example, or the lawsuit might concern the
ownership of property situated abroad. The questions that conflict of laws answers are whether a court can and should hear a case with a foreign element,
and if so, what law it should apply. That is, a court must first decide whether it
has jurisdiction, given that the case could potentially be tried elsewhere instead.
Once the court has taken jurisdiction, conflicts governs the choice of law question: namely, whether the court applies its own law to some or all of the issues,
as opposed to the law of another jurisdiction connected to the case. A Canadian
court might apply U.S. tort law, for example, or a Maryland court might apply
South Dakota contract law.
At first glance, the conventional associations of conflicts make it seem unpromising for feminism/culture issues. For one, although conflict of laws does
deal with the area of the family, in U.S. legal circles it is more often associated
with issues such as out-of-state car accidents, cross-border products liability,
and international antitrust litigation than with issues commonly coded as cultural.11 We start, however, by illustrating that the day-to-day areas of work and
the economy that make up the nuts-and-bolts issues of private law can raise
feminism/culture issues as well. Part II introduces a hypothetical case based on

11. Prominent issues in a 2010 survey of cases in U.S. courts include traffic accidents,
car-owner’s liability, employment-related torts, medical malpractice, worker’s compensation, and child support. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts
in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 337-49, 368-85 (2011).
Conflicts has recently become relevant to issues of sexuality because it governs the recognition of foreign or out-of-state same-sex unions. See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES (2006);
Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the United States, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 257 (2006). However, friend and foe alike treat conflicts as a way station en route
to the legalization of same-sex marriage and not as a valuable paradigm in and of itself. An
exception is Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage, Part II: Travelling Marriage, 8
UNBOUND (forthcoming 2012). See also Ralf Michaels, After the Revolution—Decline and
Return of U.S. Conflict of Laws, 11 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 11, 21-22 (2009).
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an actual dispute litigated in California between a Japanese father and daughter
over a transfer of shares. Our choice of example thus cuts against the oftencriticized tendency of Western feminists to focus on “exotic” ethical questions
such as veiling and clitoridectomy that are usually the province of constitutional law or international human rights law, to the neglect of questions about the
economic conditions of women in other cultures.12 It also shows that economics, in fact, takes us back to the same feminism/culture debate.13 Even mundane
aspects of corporate law prove to be dizzyingly indeterminate and complex in
their feminist and cultural dimensions.
What makes conflict of laws seem particularly counterintuitive as a method
for dealing with conflicts of feminism and culture, though, is not the kinds of
private law issues it brings to mind, but its highly technical nature. The field
has famously been described as a “dismal swamp . . . inhabited by learned but
eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon.”14 Yet a court required to apply foreign law in a conflicts case runs up against the same “how different is too different” question
that confronts feminists in any instance of feminism/culture—the ethical moment at which some feminists will decide that compromise with or tolerance of
cultural difference ends. In contrast to feminism/culture analyses, however, a
conflicts analysis gets to that ethical moment only after going through a series
of technical steps. We will show that far from being a shortcoming of the field,
these technicalities bring to the fore a vital level of detail that feminism/culture
analyses must generate from first principles—and seldom achieve. Moreover,
we argue that as a matter of sociology of knowledge, adhering to the constraints
of form that characterize conflicts technicalities more often opens up an alternative resolution, or indeed alternative questions for theory and practice, and
hence renders the “how different is too different” question less inevitable.
Thus the fruitfulness of conflicts lies in viewing it as technique. By “technique,” we mean the technical aspect of law, particularly although not uniquely

12. See, e.g., Cyra Akila Choudhury, Exporting Subjects: Globalizing Family Law
Progress Through International Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259, 307-09 (2011);
Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminisms: When Discourses Keep Meeting,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 47, 65-66 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005); Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1181, 1204-05, 1208-10 (2001); Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights Law and the Demonization of Culture (and Anthropology Along the Way), POLAR, May 2003, at 55, 58, 63-64.
13. Cf. Vasuki Nesiah, The Ground Beneath Her Feet: TWAIL Feminisms, in THE
THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW, POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION 133, 140-41
(Antony Anghie et al. eds., 2003) (agreeing that a focus on women’s material well-being is
needed to correct for the damaging tendency to frame all questions about third world feminism in terms of universalism versus cultural relativism, but arguing that this contrast of the
economic to the cultural may miss the ways in which economic systems reflect cultural practices).
14. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
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present in private law, which foregrounds questions of form. The technical aspect of law encompasses:
(1) certain ideologies—legal instrumentalism and managerialism . . . (2) certain categories of experts—especially scholars, bureaucrats and practitioners
who treat the law as a kind of tool or machine and who see themselves as
modest but expertly devoted technicians; (3) a problem-solving paradigm—an
orientation toward defining concrete, practical problems and toward crafting
solutions; (4) a form of reasoning and argumentation, from eight-part tests to
reasoning by analogy, to the production of stock types of policy arguments to
practices of statutory interpretation or citation to case law.15

In this approach, “[l]egal knowledge is certainly not an end in itself—it always
has a larger purpose. But at the same time, it is also not simply a pass-through
to an economic or social end.”16
When the doctrines and larger moves of conflicts are approached in this
mode—when its technicalities are treated as an intellectual style—conflicts can
offer a fresh approach to the feminism/culture debate. As our definition of
technique suggests, we have in mind the broader conflicts tradition in which its
adepts are schooled, rather than the conflicts method often encountered in the
United States, which is more narrowly understood as either interest analysis or
the most significant relationship test. That said, we focus on those aspects of
the tradition that hold out the greatest promise for the feminism/culture debate.
In Part III, we illustrate our argument by working through our hypothetical
dispute between father and daughter again, this time in accordance with a conflict of laws analysis, showing how conflicts navigates the indeterminacy and
complexity of the cultural and feminist dimensions seen in Part II. Part III demonstrates that conflict of laws captures and operationalizes important insights
of feminist thinking on culture that we identify in Part I—summing up something in the air about how we approach these issues now. Yet, as Part III goes
on to show, conflicts also reveals new possibilities. As a result, it provides a
way for feminists to acknowledge the complexity of culture without becoming
bogged down. While we explain the kind of work that each step in a conflict of
laws analysis would do in resolving our hypothetical dispute, we do not propose an actual resolution in this Article because our goal is to show the promise
of a style, not to stand for a particular result. That is, we believe that changing
the tools with which we think can open up the ways in which we theorize and
ultimately master seemingly familiar problems.
In elaborating on our approach, Part IV engages a potential objection: are
we not ignoring the legal realists’ lesson that technicalities often obscure or dilute political conflict? Our answer lies in a final reason why conflict of laws is
both a surprising and a promising resource for the feminism/culture debate.
Conflicts was once in the very vanguard of the realist revolution, but is now
15. ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING
FINANCIAL MARKETS 64-65 (2011).
16. Id. at 70.

IN THE

GLOBAL
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most often presented as layers of unsatisfactory yet not quite discarded theories.
Yet, as we explain, this means that the discipline comes with built-in critiques;
it is self-conscious about its use of form.
In Part V, we contrast the conflict of laws style with the familiar strategies
in the feminism/culture debate featured in Part I. Conflicts thus offers a third
contribution: it furnishes a critical vantage point on the state of feminist legal
theory and its engagement with culture, enabling us to join with others who
have questioned the familiar strategies, and offering one picture of an alternative.
I. HOW FEMINISM BECAME ENTANGLED IN THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE
Feminism has been described as “becoming prone to paralysis by cultural
difference, with anxieties about cultural imperialism engendering a kind of relativism that [has] made it difficult to represent any belief or practice as oppressive to women or at odds with gender equality.”17 How did feminism get to this
impasse? The story has been told in many ways.18 In this Part, we tell it as one
of complexity produced by feminist engagements with changing conceptions of
culture.
The account offered here relies both on discussions of multicultural states,
where the issue is to what extent the law should recognize the value of a minority’s culture or its autonomy if the minority’s norms conflict with gender equality, and on discussions of international law, where the issue also sounds in sovereignty and nonintervention.19 As our focus is primarily on successive
approaches to culture taken by legal feminists and feminists influential in the
legal literature, our account does not attempt to summarize the full debates on
the roles of culture and multiculturalism, nor to incorporate the trajectory of
feminist legal theory beyond its engagement with this problem.20
A. Feminism Versus Culture: Equality > Culture
Susan Moller Okin’s essay Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? is an elegant and prominent example of the initial framing of the issue as feminism ver-

17. PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 1.
18. Helpful accounts include Engle, supra note 12, analyzing the challenges of third

world feminists to liberal and structural bias feminists in the context of international human
rights, and Minow, supra note 10.
19. In this Article, we use “culture” broadly to include religion and sexuality. By discussing culture in both the multicultural and transnational contexts, we are not implying any
particular correspondence between a culture as it exists in its country of origin and as it exists in the diaspora.
20. We indicate in Parts III-V where our approach might join with feminist methods
that have not figured prominently in the legal literature on feminism/culture.
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sus culture.21 The insight here is that there is an ethical moment, as we will call
it, a hard choice to be made between two sets of values. And for Okin, although not for all feminists who frame the choice this way, equality always
trumps.
By multiculturalism, Okin means the claim made in some Western liberal
democracies that minority cultures are not sufficiently protected by ensuring
the individual rights (such as freedom of association or religion) of their members, and that minority cultures should therefore also be protected by recognizing the special rights of these groups as groups.22 Okin argues not only that
“[m]ost cultures are suffused with practices and ideologies concerning gender,”23 but that most also have as a principal aim the control of women by
men.24 Over time, some traditionally patriarchal cultures, principally Western
liberal cultures, have become more egalitarian than others.25 These basic facts
about culture should alert us to the potential for conflict between multiculturalism and feminism, where feminism is understood as “the belief that women . . . should be recognized as having human dignity equal to that of men, and
that they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely chosen
lives as men can.”26 Group rights endanger the equal rights of women within
the group because collective rights are often claimed by minorities with cultures that are more patriarchal than the surrounding culture.27 Okin illustrates
with an example from French immigration policy. Although polygamy is illegal
in France, the French government in the 1980s granted immigrant men permission to bring multiple wives into the country, even though many wives themselves proved to be strongly opposed to the practice.28 If we agree that women
should not be disadvantaged because of their sex, Okin argues, we should not
accept group rights that allow practices oppressive to women on the grounds
that these practices are fundamental to the preservation of minority cultures.
On an Okin-style analysis, the ethical moment comes immediately: equality trumps culture. This is the academic formulation of a position shared by
much mainstream political discourse, including the politicians cited in our Introduction. It also resonates with key universal human rights instruments. For
example, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,
21. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?,
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
22. Id. at 10-11.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id. at 16.
26. Id. at 10.
27. See id. at 17.
28. Id. at 9-10.

in
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to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”29 This
right has been interpreted as giving fairly robust protections to groups.30 In addition, if “minorities” are also recognized as “peoples”—indigenous groups, for
instance31—they have a right of self-determination under the Covenant, by virtue of which “they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.”32 Equality trumps, however, because the Covenant contains several articles on nondiscrimination and, in particular, an umbrella article requiring states “to ensure the equal right of men
and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the
present Covenant.”33
Whereas many feminist activists and academics continue to frame the conflict as equality versus culture, some do not give all of the trumps to equality.34
Instead, compromise and tolerance are two common strategies. The aim of
compromise is to find the right balance between equality and culture.35 The
other culture may be tolerated, but only to a certain degree. To quote Duncan
Kennedy’s description of this legal consciousness:
When an identity is recognized, it will be through a typically contemporary
mix of highly formal norms, of equality and nondiscrimination, with a highly
negotiated, ad hoc set of norms, about tolerance or accommodation for identity
defining practices like “sodomy” and the veil . . . . In other words, public law

29. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also id. art. 18 (guaranteeing
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion).
30. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 23, General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶¶ 6.1, 6.2, 7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 26, 1994).
31. Cf. Mahuika v. New Zealand, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No.
547/1993, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (Nov. 16, 2000).
32. ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 1.
33. ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 3; see also id. arts. 2, 26; U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 28, Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000). Compare United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, arts. 4-5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept.
13, 2007) (indigenous peoples have the right to “autonomy or self-government” and to
“maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions”), with id. arts. 44, 46(3) (equality trumps). Not surprisingly, the most demanding
trumping provisions are found in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, arts. 1-5, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13
(providing for transformative as well as formal substantive equality for women). On transformative equality, see RIKKI HOLTMAAT & JONNEKE NABER, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CULTURE: FROM DEADLOCK TO DIALOGUE 25-43 (2011).
34. See, e.g., Engle, supra note 12, at 63-64 & n.57 (describing convergence on a sort
of middle ground she encompasses with the term “culturally sensitive universalism”).
35. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis
of Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women’s Equality Under International Law, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 367, 396-97 (2007).

KNOP, MICHAELS & RILES 64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (DO NOT DELETE)

March 2012]

3/9/2012 5:18 PM

CULTURE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS

599

neoformalism combined with conflicting considerations (balancing, proportionality).36

In the international context of human rights and domestic violence, Sally
Engle Merry similarly describes activists, reformers, and policymakers alike as
“constantly tack[ing] between the goals of respecting cultural diversity and protecting women’s safety. They use pragmatic compromise and situationally determined decision-making.”37
Balancing is sometimes done through a multifactor test, rather than ad hoc.
For example, Karima Bennoune’s approach to the issue of headscarves or other
“modest” garments for Muslim women and girls in public educational institutions involves the consideration of multiple factors in context, including the
impact on other women or girls of wearing the headscarf or other garments,
coercion of women by religious extremist organizations or other groups, related
violence against women, the motivations of those imposing a dress restriction,
Islamophobia or religious discrimination, alternatives to restrictions, possible
consequences for human rights both of restrictions and of a lack thereof, and
whether the relevant constituencies have been consulted.38 This combination of
factors, she asserts, is “more likely to produce substantively rights-friendly results for the most women and girls in the long run.”39
It is important to note that such positions between equality and culture may
reflect stable normative preferences as between the two, or they may instead be
a starting position aimed at the real-world transformation of other societies or
states in the direction of equality. Since most of these positions seek to incorporate some or all of the critical developments in the understanding of culture, we
will return to them after introducing these developments.
B. Relativist Critiques of Feminism: Culture Versus Culture
Framing the issue as equality versus culture soon drew cultural relativist
critiques. The target of the relativist critiques is the underlying assumption that
“‘culture’ is what nonliberal peoples are . . . ruled and ordered by . . . . [W]e
have culture while they are a culture. Or, we are a democracy while they are a
culture.”40 In other words, liberal arguments about equality, including Okin’s,
36. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 67 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). Janet Halley argues that the idea of rights always in
need of balancing also describes the legal consciousness introduced into U.S. family law by
the feminist interventions that significantly transformed the field from the 1970s onward. See
Janet Halley, What Is Family Law? A Genealogy (pt. 2), 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 26971 (2011).
37. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE 25-26 (2006).
38. Bennoune, supra note 35, at 396.
39. Id. at 396.
40. WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND
EMPIRE 150-51 (2006).
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do not actually stand outside and above culture. Rather, liberalism is itself a
culture, and, thus, what are pitted against one another are two cultures.41 This
leaves no neutral viewpoint from which to comment on, let alone intervene in,
another culture, whether for reasons of gender equality or other liberal reasons.
We will call this basic insight seeing culture.
A related but distinct critique of this assumption stems from self-reflexivity.
In anthropology, self-reflexivity is the idea that the anthropologist must put
herself in the frame; she must be as much the subject of her study as the people
among whom she does her fieldwork.42 While not necessarily subscribing to
the relativists’ broadening of culture to include democracy or liberalism, selfreflexive feminists reject the assumption that we can make choices about our
lives because our culture is just something we have, whereas others’ lives are
determined by their culture (they are its victims) because culture is what they
are. These authors criticize Western feminists for tending to see culture as the
explanation for gender oppression within non-Western communities, while failing to see women in the West as likewise culturally situated.43 Critics point to
Western examples such as the premium placed on women’s beauty, thinness,
and youth and the greater prevalence of cosmetic surgery among Western
women as compared to Western men.44 They argue that Western women’s focus on appearance is wrongly understood as an individual choice, rather than a
culturally conditioned one—a personal penchant for high heels as opposed to
Chinese foot-binding.45 Meanwhile, women elsewhere are wrongly depicted as

41. See id.; see also MERRY, supra note 37, at 16, 228-29 (criticizing the assumption
that “villages are full of culture” whereas international human rights law operates in a culture-free zone, and arguing that international human rights law itself should be understood
primarily as a cultural system); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the
“Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 78 (1994) (observing that arguments precluding the judicial recognition of culture forget that the “legal system already has a culture”).
42. See ROY WAGNER, THE INVENTION OF CULTURE (rev. & expanded ed. 1981). For
an application to feminist legal theory, see, for example, Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze
Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies, and the Postcolonial Project,
1997 UTAH L. REV. 525, 527-28.
43. See, e.g., UMA NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES: IDENTITIES, TRADITIONS, AND
THIRD-WORLD FEMINISM (1997); Inderpal Grewal, “Women’s Rights as Human Rights”:
Feminist Practices, Global Feminism, and Human Rights Regimes in Transnationality, 3
CITIZENSHIP STUD. 337 (1999); Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling
and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 189 (1992); Audrey Macklin, Particularized Citizenship: Encultured Women and the
Public Sphere, in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER 276,
291-92 (Seyla Benhabib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009); Naomi Mezey, Law’s Culture and
Lived Culture: A Comment on Roger Cotterrell’s “The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of
Cultural Legality,” 4 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 395, 397-98 (2009); Volpp, supra note 12, at
1186-89, 1212-14, 1217.
44. It should be pointed out that Okin herself does not overlook the gendered nature of
Western culture, and, indeed, gives these examples. Okin, supra note 21, at 16.
45. For a feminist account of Chinese foot-binding that accents women’s agency, see
DOROTHY KO, EVERY STEP A LOTUS: SHOES FOR BOUND FEET (2001). On whether high heels
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lacking agency and thus unable to exercise any degree of choice with regard to
their culture.46 Indeed, some non-Western cultural practices, such as veiling,
which seem thoroughly discriminatory in the eyes of Western feminists, are
shown to be circumscribed but carefully calibrated personalized choices within
certain Islamic contexts.47
Self-reflexivity thus leads to the insight which we will term culture and
agency. Recognizing that women in other cultures are not simply victims in
need of saving introduces the principle of choice into the feminism/culture debate, to be balanced against the principle of equality. But this, in turn, leads to
what Martha Minow describes as endless “dueling accusations of false consciousness” between liberals and cultural defenders: “You say that women in
my culture have false consciousness, but you say this because of your own false
consciousness—or I think this because of my own false consciousness, and so
forth.”48
The insights of self-reflexivity and of culture and agency are sometimes
revealed through a hypothetical cross-cultural dialogue. In María Lugones’s
well-known words, “Through travelling to other people’s ‘worlds’ we discover
that there are ‘worlds’ in which those who are the victims of arrogant perception are really subjects, lively beings, resistors, constructors of visions . . . .”49
This is dialogue for the purpose of cross-cultural understanding, to be distinguished from dialogue as a common strategy for transforming cultures, which
we will discuss later.50

and other fashion items represent oppression or empowerment, compare NAOMI WOLF, THE
BEAUTY MYTH: HOW IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST WOMEN (1991), and ANGELA
MCROBBIE, THE AFTERMATH OF FEMINISM: GENDER, CULTURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (2009),
with Jennifer Baumgardner & Amy Richards, Feminism and Femininity: Or How We
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Thong, in ALL ABOUT THE GIRL: CULTURE, POWER,
AND IDENTITY 59 (Anita Harris ed., 2004).
46. For the criticism about lack of agency, see, for example, RATNA KAPUR, The Tragedy of Victimisation Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in International/Postcolonial Feminist Legal Politics, in EROTIC JUSTICE: LAW AND THE NEW POLITICS OF
POSTCOLONIALISM 95 (2005); Saba Mahmood, Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival, 16 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
202 (2001); and Volpp, supra note 12, at 1192, 1211-12. But see Michelle A. McKinley,
Cultural Culprits, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 91, 114-15 (2009) (cautioning against
“over-agentivizing”).
47. See, e.g., Lama Abu Odeh, Post-Colonial Feminism and the Veil: Thinking the
Difference, 43 FEMINIST REV., Spring 1993, at 26; see also PASCALE FOURNIER, MUSLIM
MARRIAGE IN WESTERN COURTS: LOST IN TRANSPLANTATION (2010) (analyzing the mahr—an
amount promised to the Muslim bride by the Muslim groom as a condition of a valid Islamic
marriage—as a tool of relative bargaining power between husband and wife).
48. Minow, supra note 10, at 131.
49. María Lugones, Playfulness, “World”-Travelling, and Loving Perception, in
MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL: HACIENDO CARAS 390, 402 (Gloria Anzaldúa ed., 1990).
50. See infra notes 68-69, 229-31, and accompanying text.
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C. Post-Essentialist Critiques of Culture: Taking Apart Cultures
A later line of critique, what we might term the post-essentialist critique,
also takes issue with the meaning of culture at work in the Okin-style opposition of equality and culture, but in a different way. It aims at the underlying assumption that culture is associated with settled tradition and fixity, the assumption that it is monolithic and static. The post-essentialist critique derives from
the more recent anthropological insight that culture is indeed tradition, but it is
“invented” tradition.51 Invention is not meant here in the negative sense of artifice, but in the sense that culture is a dynamic practice of making and remaking
meanings that are provisional, shifting, and partial.52 If this is so, then cultures
are contestable and negotiable. They involve agency.53 Moreover, they may internalize outside influences and impositions or may borrow and appropriate
ideas; in short, they may be hybrid, rather than pure.54
Lovelace v. Canada, decided by the U.N. Human Rights Committee in
1981, is a good illustration of the different conclusions about a cultural claim
that might follow from a post-essentialist conception of culture.55 Sandra Lovelace lost her status and rights as a Maliseet Indian because she had “married
out” to a non-Indian, which would not have changed her status or rights had she
been an Indian man. The Lovelace case is most often portrayed as a conflict be-

51. See THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., Canto
ed. 1992); NICHOLAS THOMAS, IN OCEANIA: VISIONS, ARTIFACTS, HISTORIES 17-18, 186
(1997); Charles L. Briggs, The Politics of Discursive Authority in Research on the “Invention of Tradition,” 11 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 435, 435-36 (1996); Richard Handler &
Jocelyn Linnekin, Tradition, Genuine or Spurious, 97 J. AM. FOLKLORE 273 (1984); Allan
Hanson, The Making of the Maori: Culture Invention and Its Logic, 91 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 890 (1989); Jean Jackson, Is There a Way to Talk About Making Culture
Without Making Enemies?, 14 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 127, 127 (1989); Roger M.
Keesing, Creating the Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary Pacific, 1 CONTEMP.
PAC. 19, 19-20 (1989); Stephanie Lawson, The Tyranny of Tradition: Critical Reflections on
Nationalist Narratives in the South Pacific, in NARRATIVES OF NATION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC
27 (Ton Otto & Nicholas Thomas eds., 1997); Jocelyn S. Linnekin, Defining Tradition: Variations on the Hawaiian Identity, 10 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 241 (1983); Thomas Spear, NeoTraditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa, 44 J. AFR. HIST. 3
(2003); S.N. Eisenstadt, Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of
Tradition, 102 DAEDALUS, Winter 1973, at 1, 5.
52. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Contingent Articulations: A Critical Cultural Studies of
Law, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 21 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
1998).
53. See, e.g., MERRY, supra note 37, at 11-16; Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112
YALE L.J. 1399 (2003) (making the same point about religion).
54. See, e.g., RATNA KAPUR, Erotic Disruptions: Legal Narratives of Culture, Sex and
Nation in India, in EROTIC JUSTICE: LAW AND THE NEW POLITICS OF POSTCOLONIALISM, supra
note 46, at 51.
55. Lovelace v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. R.6/24, U.N.
Doc. A/36/40 (July 30, 1981). For an overview of the complex First Nations politics associated
with the case, see John Borrows, Contemporary Traditional Equality: The Effect of the Charter
on First Nation Politics, 43 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 19 (1994).
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tween women’s equal rights and the group’s right to apply its traditional membership rules or to set the rules.56 Although “Indian” is actually the category
used by the Indian Act, which originated in the colonial period, the Canadian
government argued that the statutory definition reflected indigenous tradition.
In addition to arguing that the Act discriminated on the basis of sex, Lovelace
disputed the government’s contention about tradition.57 She maintained that the
Maliseet were historically matrilineal, but that Maliseet men, at least, had come
to believe that the Act’s patrilineal rules codified their own custom.58 That is,
she made the post-essentialist point that what appeared to be indigenous tradition was, in fact, an invention of colonial bureaucrats.
Lovelace may be read as exemplifying either a weaker or a stronger postessentialist critique. On the weaker critique, underneath the invented tradition
lies the authentic tradition that was lost when the colonized absorbed the version systematized, purveyed, and imposed by the colonizer. On the stronger
post-essentialist critique, all culture is invented. If more were known about the
earlier Maliseet matriarchal tradition, it would become apparent that it too was
invented.
Thus we should recognize that at any one time, insiders will have different
interpretations of their culture. For instance, women might “reinterpret the
meaning of arranged marriage and actively invert the power hierarchies associated with customary families [by] . . . ‘agreeing to marry a partner chosen
through family but [still] insisting on some autonomy.’”59 In such cases, British
immigration judges have been criticized for concluding that the marriage was
neither a “real” marriage (being arranged) nor a “real” arranged marriage (deviating from traditional interpretation of the custom).60 But if any account of a
culture is contested or contestable, how can we mount a cultural claim at all
without falling back into essentialism?
One influential response has been Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s idea of
strategic essentialism, which she developed in the context of postcolonial studies. Unlike much-criticized essentialism, strategic essentialism recognizes that
the essential attributes of a group are socially constructed rather than natural. It
56. See, e.g., HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 223-24 (2000); Anne F. Bayefsky, The Human
Rights Committee and the Case of Sandra Lovelace, 20 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 244 (1982); David S.
Berry, Contextualising International Women’s Rights: Canadian Feminism, Race and Culture, in LEGAL FEMINISMS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 119, 125-27 (Clare McGlynn ed., 1998).
57. Lovelace, supra note 55, ¶ 6.
58. See KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
358-72 (2002).
59. Angelia K. Means, Intercultural Political Identity: Are We There Yet?, in
MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER, supra note 43, at 380,
391 (second alteration in original) (quoting Susan Sterett, Intercultural Citizenship: Statutory Interpretation and Belonging in Britain, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 119, 121 (Sally J. Kenney et al. eds., 1999)).
60. See id.

KNOP, MICHAELS & RILES 64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (DO NOT DELETE)

604

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

3/9/2012 5:18 PM

[Vol. 64:589

refers to the deliberate choice to develop a general category or essentialized
community, such as “indigenous,” for the purpose of achieving particular political aims. According to Spivak, strategic essentialism is, in fact, a means to resist essentialism. It empowers oppressed groups by giving them a way to define
themselves and thus resist their definition by powerful others. This strategy is
at once politically effective and deconstructive because it operates on the potential—the group’s potential and logically any subgroup’s potential—to redefine the essence of identity.61 Whereas lapsing into essentialism is a problem,
deploying essentialism may be a valuable political intervention. Strategic essentialism may be either radical or conservative, depending on “who is utilizing
it, how it is deployed, and where its effects are concentrated.”62
D. Responses to Post-Essentialist Critiques of Culture
The anthropological insight that all culture is invented tradition has served
to undercut the opposition of culture to equality in two principal ways. For
some feminists, whom we might call transformationists, it suggests that culture
need not be the enemy of women’s equal rights. As Sally Engle Merry puts it,
“Seeing culture as open to change emphasizes struggles over cultural values
within local communities and encourages attention to local cultural practices as
resources for change.”63 There is room to transform a given culture while still
paying respect to culture as a concept. For others, who can be loosely grouped
together as minimizers, the recognition that all cultural claims rest on a contestable account of the culture in question—an account which has often become
authoritative because of powerful (male) elites—is a reason to dispense with, or
at least minimize, the role of culture.64

61. See Criticism, Feminism and the Institution: An Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, THESIS ELEVEN, Feb. 1985, at 175, 183-84. Spivak has since distanced herself
from this notion. See, e.g., Sara Danius & Stefan Jonsson, An Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, BOUNDARY 2, Summer 1993, at 24, 34-36. On strategic essentialism and
related ideas, see Lara Karaian, The Troubled Relationship of Feminist and Queer Legal
Theory to Strategic Essentialism: Theory/Praxis, Queer Porn, and Canadian AntiDiscrimination Law, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS,
UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 375, 378-79 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds.,
2009).
62. DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE 20
(1989).
63. MERRY, supra note 37, at 9.
64. See generally KAMALA VISWESWARAN, UN/COMMON CULTURES: RACISM AND THE
REARTICULATION OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE (2010) (critiquing the traditional anthropological concept of culture for essentializing cultural identity and therefore precluding dialogue).
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1. Transforming cultures
The idea of transforming cultures as a way to reconcile respect for the concept with a commitment to gender equality has influenced the thinking of feminist legal academics in various ways. Three serve here as representative. In a
first transformationist mode, the recognition that culture is invented has led feminists to look for the inventors. As in the Lovelace scenario, feminist members of the community seek and advance alternative interpretations of their culture which may have been suppressed historically by the colonizer, the
community’s political leadership, or its cultural elites in favor of a patriarchal
interpretation.65 Feminists thus counter one cultural claim with another—but
theirs is an act of strategic self-definition as against those who would oppress
women by defining them. It is Spivak-style strategic essentialism rather than
simple essentialism.
Yet in seeing women in other cultures as engaged in strategic essentialism,
we again encounter the challenge of understanding the “other.” Legal feminists
in the West tend to assume that women will practice strategic essentialism in
order to advance a more egalitarian version of their culture, whereas anthropologist Saba Mahmood describes women in Egypt who wear the veil not as a
“manipulable mask[] in a game of public presentation,” but in order to help cultivate a form of pious “shyness.”66 The “desires, motivations, commitments,
and aspirations of the people to whom these practices are important,” she argues, must be considered when evaluating claims of essentialism.67
The fluidity of culture also grounds a second set of proposals for transformative transcultural dialogue;68 that is, alliances with feminist dissenters inside
a particular culture.69 If the dominant patriarchal account of that culture is socially constructed or up for argument, then intervention on the side of an alter-

65. See, e.g., Lata Mani, Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India, in RECASTING WOMEN: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY 88 (Kumkum Sangari & Sudesh
Vaid eds., 1989); see also Valentine M. Moghadam, Global Feminism, Citizenship, and the
State: Negotiating Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, in MIGRATIONS AND
MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER, supra note 43, at 255, 269 (“The Moroccan case is a striking example of how women’s rights advocates can build coalitions to generate social dialogues, have an impact on key policy debates, and help effect legal reform
and public policy changes.”).
66. Mahmood, supra note 46, at 214.
67. Id. at 225; see also SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL
AND THE FEMINIST SUBJECT (2005).
68. Cf. supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., HOLTMAAT & NABER, supra note 33, at 106-07; Karima Bennoune, Remembering the Other’s Others: Theorizing the Approach of International Law to Muslim
Fundamentalism, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 635, 686-89, 691 (2010); Madhavi Sunder,
Enlightened Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 891, 901-02 (2005). For the argument that
this strategy of “splitting and seduction” has colonial echoes, which is not to condemn it per
se, see Nathaniel Berman, “The Appeals of the Orient”: Colonized Desire and the War of
the Riff, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 195, 206-08 (Karen Knop ed., 2004).
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native, more egalitarian account, it seems to be implied, is not interfering with
authenticity or imposing outside values.70
Similarly, if all cultures “innovate, appropriate, and create local practices,”71 then meshing arguments about women’s international human rights with
strategic essentialist arguments cannot be objected to simply because it may introduce outside influences. Merry’s multi-sited ethnographic account of how
international human rights norms on violence against women interact with local
culture recommends a process of “vernacularizing” women’s human rights.
Their universality is preserved by translating them into familiar cultural terms
(which makes them less disturbing to local elites and therefore easier to adopt)
while retaining the human rights framework (which makes them more transformative).72 Merry’s work implicitly highlights both the limits of translation
as a way to overcome the earlier cultural relativism critique, and the limits of
strategic essentialism as a way to overcome the post-essentialist critique.
Critics caution that transformationists can lose sight of the well-entrenched
institutional forms that culture takes. In debates about whether Western multicultural democracies should recognize Islamic faith-based arbitration of family
and inheritance matters, for instance, some opponents argue that although progressive interpretations of Islamic law are possible in theory, historical and
modern precedents point to the strong likelihood that Islamic law would be interpreted and applied in ways that would be more patriarchal and damaging to
women than the state’s law.73
Accordingly, a third transformationist strategy seeks to restructure the
overarching rules so as to shift incentive structures within the group and thereby empower the internal dissenters (whatever the grounds of their claims, cultural or egalitarian). One such example is Madhavi Sunder’s three-part procedural prescription. First, Sunder argues that instead of privileging the norms of
cultural elites, as they now do, international and national legal decisionmakers
should “place elites and dissenters on an equal footing” when a dispute is
brought to them.74 Second, the state should ensure that marginalized voices are
able to participate in the processes of creating cultural meaning.75 Third, legal

70. There are also, of course, arguments for intervention qua intervention. See Sunder,
supra note 53.
71. MERRY, supra note 37, at 228.
72. See id. at 222; see also SIOBHÁN MULLALLY, GENDER, CULTURE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: RECLAIMING UNIVERSALISM (2006).
73. Macklin, supra note 43, at 287; see also David Jacobson, Multiculturalism, Gender, and Rights, in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER, supra
note 43, at 304, 322.
74. Sunder, supra note 53, at 1466-67; see also Linda C. McClain, Negotiating Gender
and (Free and Equal) Citizenship: The Place of Associations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1569,
1595-97 (2004).
75. Sunder, supra note 53, at 1468.
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decisionmakers should ultimately choose among the competing accounts of a
culture on a substantive basis, rejecting discriminatory accounts.76
Ayelet Shachar’s idea of “transformative accommodation” is another example of a transformative approach attentive to incentive structures.77 On her
model for multicultural states, the authority to decide matters critical for a minority’s self-definition would be divided between the minority and the state,
creating a form of joint governance similar to those found in federal systems.
Neither jurisdiction would have a monopoly over these matters, neither could
trump the other, and choice options would be clearly delineated. Shachar’s design tolerates discriminatory internal restrictions on the theory that its features
will “alleviate, or at least significantly mitigate, the paradox of multicultural
vulnerability by equipping members with means of combating unjust internal
restrictions,” while also working “to preserve and even enhance the accommodation of group traditions through state-backed external protections.”78 We
might think of her model as a compromise in that it aims at equality in all matters, but takes the chance that the incentive structure it proposes may not deliver this result for the matters within the minority’s jurisdiction.
2. Minimizing culture
The other group of feminist responses to the post-essentialist idea of culture is less inclined toward a role for culture. One line of this response is to replace or minimize culture as a frame. Authors following this line are wary of
strategic essentialism as a resource for women, emphasizing that regardless of
which insider account of a culture is authorized, any account proceeds by excluding some other insider account, most often the account of those still further
subjugated.79 Ratna Kapur, for example, proposes that cultural claims be reframed; specifically, she advocates that sexual practices in India be evaluated
not in terms of their cultural authenticity, but rather in terms of erotic desire
and exclusion.80 In response, Maneesha Deckha notes that proposals such as
Kapur’s offer a practical alternative only when such reframing is possible,
whether in terms of sexuality, justice, pain, or other concepts. “Eliminating cultural claims at this historical moment would leave many vulnerable groups
without any legal tool to guard against cultural disintegration, extinction, or exploitation. . . . [S]ome essentialism in cultural claims must be tolerated. It will

76. Id. at 1469.
77. See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS

14 (2001).

78. Id.
79. See KAPUR, supra note 54, at 88-90; Maneesha Deckha, Is Culture Taboo? Femin-

ism, Intersectionality, and Culture Talk in Law, 16 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 14, 35-36 (2004);
Volpp, supra note 41, at 98-99.
80. KAPUR, supra note 54, at 90-93.
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be a trade-off of potentially essentializing means for egalitarian ends.”81 In the
context of immigrant women and the so-called cultural defense in criminal law,
Leti Volpp formulates a modified strategic essentialism, in which cultural information going to an immigrant defendant’s state of mind would only be allowed if this was consistent with the principle of antisubordination.82 Cultural
information would be permitted in the case of an Asian woman seeking to explain her mental state when she attempted to commit parent-child suicide, for
instance, but not in the case of an Asian man seeking a cultural defense for his
violence against an Asian woman.83 In a similar vein, Deckha accepts the strategic use of cultural essentialism as a last resort provided that the cultural claim
does not subordinate women or others within the cultural minority by impairing
their autonomy or equality. She also accepts that such claims might privilege
the interests of some vulnerable members and not others, so long as they meet
this antisubordination condition.84 In contrast to anthropologists like Mahmood, who seek to offer accounts of feminist insiders using strategically essentialist accounts of their culture as a tool of empowerment, legal academics like
Kapur, Volpp, and Deckha are primarily interested in making non-essentialist
or essentialist claims for a purpose and only secondarily as a description of how
things are. Thus, they turn anthropological accounts of cultural tools into legal
tools of their own.85
As distinct from discarding or limiting culture as a frame, another line of
culture-minimizing response by feminists foregrounds choice. In her proposal
for what she calls “multiculturalism without culture,” Anne Phillips dispenses
with an essentialist understanding of culture and offers “[a] defensible multiculturalism [that] will put human agency much more at its centre.”86 A concrete
example might be the 2004 report commissioned by the government of the Canadian province of Ontario as a result of public concern about the use of Muslim personal law to arbitrate family and inheritance issues. Intended to examine
the impact of arbitration on vulnerable people, including women, the report
recommended that enforceable faith-based arbitration continue to be available

81. Deckha, supra note 79, at 38.
82. Volpp, supra note 41, at 91, 95, 97-100.
83. Id. at 59-60, 97-100; see also Leti Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Na-

tion, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1585, 1594-96 (1996).
84. Deckha, supra note 79, at 52.
85. Cf. Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture
in the Iron Cage, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 52, 62 (2006).
86. PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 9. For yet another perspective, see DAVINA COOPER,
CHALLENGING DIVERSITY: RETHINKING EQUALITY AND THE VALUE OF DIFFERENCE 74-78,
192-94 (2004) (arguing for “recentr[ing] social inequality, rather than cultural harm, as diversity’s problematic” and emphasizing equality of power as distinct from equality of resources, on the one hand, and equality of recognition, on the other).
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under the province’s Arbitration Act, but also recommended specific procedural safeguards to ensure that the parties gave their informed consent.87
* * *
Can the concept of culture be deployed without falling back into essentialism? To take the post-essentialist critique as license to transform a culture is to
hollow out the concept of culture itself. Then again, to discard culture for this
reason is logically to discard any claim based on group attributes—the category
of “women” is likewise socially constructed. In short, changing conceptions of
culture have made it more difficult for feminists to keep their bearings in the
feminism/culture debate. The normative clarity of those who frame the conflict
as equality versus culture is met with layer upon layer of cultural complication.
In turn, this nuanced cultural analysis is confronted with the normative hard
choice. Indeed, even the most sophisticated exchanges often end on a note of
critique or complexity.88
II. A HYPOTHETICAL CASE
In this Part, we shift gears and explore what a concrete feminism/culture
conflict looks like in all its private law detail. Given the broad theoretical direction of the discussion to this point, the reader may experience something of a
shock of disconnect, followed perhaps by a sense of skepticism. But this is precisely the point. At first glance, our example may seem to have nothing to do
with the debates surveyed above. It does not concern any of the usual suspects—veils, polygamous marriages, disparaged sexual identities, and the like.
In fact, the parties themselves would be unlikely to frame the conflict as a problem of either gender or culture. And yet on closer analysis, our example proves
not only to have both feminist and cultural dimensions, but to be more dizzyingly postmodern and more complex in its postcolonial dimensions and entanglements with global capitalism than even the edgiest feminist theories
might imagine.

87. MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE,
PROMOTING INCLUSION 5, 133-37 (2004), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov
.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf. The report’s recommendations were not implemented. See Ontario Premier Rejects Use of Sharia Law, CBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2005,
5:19 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2005/09/09/sharia-protests-20050909.html.
88. See, for example, Roger Cotterrell, The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of Cultural Legality, 4 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 373 (2009), and the responses by Mezey, supra note 43;
John Mikhail, Dilemmas of Cultural Legality: A Comment on Roger Cotterrell’s “The
Struggle for Law” and a Criticism of the House of Lords’ Opinions in Begum, 4 INT’L J.L.
CONTEXT 385 (2009); and Robin West, Comments on Roger Cotterrell’s Essay, “The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of Cultural Legality,” 4 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 401 (2009).
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A. A Dispute over a Gift
Consider the following case, based on actual litigation but hypothetical in
its details:89 a conflict between a father and a daughter over the meaning of a
gift. The father, Toru, is a citizen and domiciliary of Japan, while his daughter,
Yoshiko, is a Japanese citizen now domiciled in California. The gift at issue
comprises all the shares of a corporation, the California subsidiary of a Japanese natural health foods products company founded by Toru. Toru is the
chairman of the board, principal shareholder, and CEO of the Japanese parent
company. The California subsidiary manufactures the products for the American market at a factory in California.
The gift document was drafted by a lawyer in California in both English
and Japanese versions, signed by Toru in Japan and countersigned by Yoshiko
in California. After the documentation was signed, the company registry was
amended to show Yoshiko as the owner of the shares. A year later, Toru had
his daughter execute a proxy giving him the right to vote the shares for the
maximum statutory period for which proxies are valid in California, eleven
months. Although the proxy was never renewed, Toru continued to make all
significant company decisions for several years after its expiration.
Yoshiko’s story is this: her father fully transferred control of the company
to her, but he continues to try to interfere in its internal affairs and arrogantly
second-guesses her every business decision. When the company recently lost
its primary customer, accounting for seventy-five percent of its business, Yoshiko sold some unused real estate in order to generate cash for operating expenses. This infuriated her father, who is instead pushing for a merger with
another company, owned by one of his business associates, something she opposes. Yoshiko is contemplating raising funds through various means (borrowing money or issuing stock) but first her investment bank needs clarity about
her rights in the existing company stock.
Toru’s story is this: several years ago, in anticipation of his own death or
eventual inability to head the company, he began to worry about succession
struggles between his son (who lives in Japan and works at the company headquarters) and his daughter. He was also advised that it would be more advantageous from a tax perspective to transfer shares now rather than to leave them to
his daughter in his will. His solution was to give Yoshiko the shares of the
American subsidiary “in name only” (meigi) but to retain control over the company, with the view that eventually his son would own and run the parent company while Yoshiko would own and run the smaller American subsidiary. He
claims (although she denies) that he clearly communicated his intent to retain

89. One of the authors (Riles) served as an expert witness in the litigation. See Hagiwara v. Amano, No. CIV217048 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 23, 2003). This case settled before a decision was reached, and the parties did not raise the conflict of laws issues we raise
here.
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control at the time he executed the gift documentation. Toru now maintains that
the gift of the shares “in name only” was simply a way of signaling his future
intent, and that the gift did not actually transfer control of the subsidiary (although he explicitly stated in both the English and Japanese versions that he
was making a “gift”). He brings suit against Yoshiko in California state court,
asking the court to declare him the beneficial owner of the subsidiary.
B. The Substantive Law Dimensions
From the perspective of California law, Toru faces an uphill battle. In principle, a valid gift of shares confers on the donee all rights of control and alienation. This standard legal rule reflects a much broader baseline assumption within the culture that “a gift is a gift.” “Indian gifts” and “Indian givers”—in the
problematic phrase for those who take back what they give—are frowned upon
in both law and practice.90 The problem is not that what Toru might have had
in mind—namely, to transfer title to the shares to his daughter while retaining
effective control for himself—would be impossible. The problem, rather, is that
the particular form that he chose to effectuate his wishes is incompatible with
California law.
One path for Toru lies in corporate law. Ordinarily, voting rights are inseparable from title in stock. California corporate law does not recognize transfer
of shares “in name only.” It does allow, however, for agreed restrictions on
their control.91 For example, if Toru’s aim was to prevent Yoshiko from selling
the company, the shares transferred to her could have been made subject to a
restriction on transfer. To be effective, such an explicit restriction on transfer
would have had to be noted on the shares themselves, so that third parties are
not misled.92 Likewise, a voting agreement would have obliged Yoshiko to
vote her shares as Toru directed, though breach of such an agreement would be
actionable only as between the parties. The parties could also have renewed
their proxy agreement when it expired.93
Trust law offers another possible way to account for the intimate relations
between these economic actors and for Toru’s intention to separate ownership
and control. Toru might have made his gift in the form of a trust, whereby the
transferee acquires legal title whereas the transferor, as beneficiary, retains ef-

90. See Jonathan Parry, The Gift, the Indian Gift, and the “Indian Gift,” 21 MAN (n.s.)
453, 461 (1986).
91. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 702(c) (West 2012).
92. See id. § 418(b).
93. See id. § 706. Section 7.31(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act likewise
provides that “[t]wo or more shareholders may provide for the manner in which they will
vote their shares by signing an agreement for that purpose.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 7.31(a) (2006).
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fective control over the stock.94 An express trust obligating Yoshiko to act as a
fiduciary for her father would not require an explicit writing as long as the intention to create a trust was ascertainable.95 But again, Toru did not comply
with these requirements. Toru might argue that the fact that Yoshiko effectively
followed Toru’s wishes in voting for a lengthy period after the transfer is evidence of the existence of an implied trust, but Yoshiko might reply that she
complied with her father’s wishes for a period of time not out of any legal obligation but simply in order to avoid conflict within the family and to do what
seemed right.
A third lens for thinking about the case might be the law of gifts.96 Like
corporate law, the law of gifts requires that the parties adhere to well-defined
formalities or the gift will fail.97 According to the common law of gifts in most
U.S. jurisdictions, including California, a gift requires both an intent to give
and delivery—complete divestment by the donor of the property.98 If the intention is to make a transfer in the future (at death, for example), the gift is not valid.99 Toru thus might argue that he lacked the requisite intent100 to make a gift,
94. Japanese corporate law recognizes trusts, but the trust form remains unattractive
for most parties. See Hideki Kanda, Politics, Formalism, and the Elusive Goal of Investor
Protection: Regulation of Structured Investment Funds in Japan, 12 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L.
569, 571-72 (1991). For a brief introduction into Japanese trust law, see Hiroto Dogauchi,
Overview of Trust Law in Japan, SCH. L. TOHOKU U., http://www.law.tohoku.ac.jp/
kokusaiB2C/link/dogauchi.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). See also Arthur Nussbaum, Sociological and Comparative Aspects of the Trust, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 408, 423, 429-30
(1938).
95. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Long Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 297 P.2d 443, 447 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
96. In the common law of most U.S. states, a gift is commonly defined as a voluntary
transfer of property by one to another without consideration. See, e.g., Heritage Bank Tinley
Park v. Steinberg (In re Grabill Corp.), 121 B.R. 983, 997 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). Under
California law, a valid gift must meet the following requirements: (1) competency of the donor to contract; (2) a voluntary intent on the part of the donor to make a gift; (3) delivery,
either actual or symbolic; (4) acceptance, actual or imputed; (5) complete divestment of all
control by the donor; and (6) lack of consideration for the gift. See, e.g., Lynch v. Lynch, 12
P.2d 741, 742 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932).
97. See, e.g., Wood v. Stephens, No. B151997, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9070,
at *8-17 (Sept. 27, 2002).
98. See Pashley v. Pashley (In re Marriage of Pashley), 115 Cal. Rptr. 537, 539 (Ct.
App. 1974); see also United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 1996); Mehren v. Dargan (In re Marriage of Mehren), 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 522, 525 (Ct. App. 2004); Garetson v. Garetson, No. A100080, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1464, at *14-15 (Feb. 18,
2004); Rolinson v. Rolinson, 282 P.2d 98, 100 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); 13 B.E. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 128 (10th ed. 2005).
99. See Crocker v. Hall (In re Hall’s Estate), 98 P. 269, 271-72 (Cal. 1908).
100. Under California law, “[i]t is the intent with which the delivery is made which is
the primary essential, for unless the donor intends to divest itself completely of control and
dominion over the property, the gift is incomplete.” Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362, 375 (Ct. App. 1999); see also Burkle v. Burkle, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 562, 567 & n.5 (Ct. App. 2006); Berl v. Rosenberg, 336 P.2d 975, 979 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1959); Blonde v. Estate of Jenkins, 281 P.2d 14, 16 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
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since his goal was only to signal his intention for succession in the future.
However, a donor’s private, undisclosed reservations alone will not be enough
to contradict other objective evidence of valid intent.101 The document with
which the shares were transferred clearly characterizes the transfer as a “gift,”
and Toru would in effect need to ask for an exception to the parol evidence rule
to prove that he intended something different. He might also argue that he did
not relinquish control—and hence did not divest himself of the property if, in
the logic of the corporate law, ownership of shares and voting rights are inseparable. However, the parties allowed Toru’s proxy to expire without renewing
it.
C. The Cultural Dimensions
1. The culture of household—corporation and kinship
Toru’s assertion that the transfer was “in name only” might seem like a
mere mistake or a flight of ignorance about (California) law. Yet what California law treats as a mistake is in fact the reflection of specific Japanese cultural
practices and ideas that frame two key social institutions—the corporation and
the kinship relation.
It is not surprising, then, that Toru’s view of things finds considerable support in Japanese law. The heads of Japanese family-owned companies commonly transfer shares to designated successors of their companies as a means of
avoiding disputes among siblings over control of a family-owned company at
the time of the death of the company head. Frequently this is done “in name only,” and there is considerable precedent in the case law for the concept of
“name-only” shareholdings.102 In these cases, courts have found that in family-

101. Frapwell v. Gillespie (In re Marriage of Frapwell), 122 Cal. Rptr. 718, 720 (Ct.
App. 1975).
102. In Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 17, 1967, Sho 42 (o) no. 231, 21 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2448, the chairman of a dōzoku gaisha, see infra note
117, issued new shares in the company and distributed them to certain employees in order to
add legitimacy to the company. The company head explained to the employees that the
transfer would be in name only, and that they would be paid a special bonus in consideration
for their participation in the scheme. Later one of the employees demanded that he receive
the shares registered in his name. The district court ruled for the company and its decision
was upheld on appeal. The high court (the regional appellate court) reasoned that where
shares are transferred in name only, and where the transferee approves the use of his name in
this way, ownership rights are retained by the party that borrows the transferee’s name. The
Japanese Supreme Court upheld the high court’s decision on the same reasoning. See Komoto Ichiro, Tanin no shōdaku no motonisono meigi o mochiite kabushiki no hikiukeganasareta
baai ni okeru kabunushi [Ownership of Shares Registered in Another Party’s Name with
That Party’s Approval], 59 MINSHŌHŌ ZASHI 57 (1968). In 1975, the Supreme Court again
reaffirmed this decision in Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 14, 1975, Sho 50 (o) no. 438,
116 MINSHŪ 475. See SUGAWARA KIKUSHI, HANREI SHŌHŌ [COMMERCIAL CODE PRECEDENT]
225 (1993). More recently, a decision of the Nagoya High Court again affirmed that actual
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owned companies, transfers of shares are tantamount to wills: ways of expressing intent about what should happen at the transferor’s passing. Hence they are
transfers “in name only” and do not confer on the transferee rights to control.
Thus, in practice, so-called “name-only” shareholders and “name-only” directors do not have the rights or duties of actual shareholders or directors. Moreover, courts confronted with disputes over transfers of shares in family-owned
companies among family members most often resolve those disputes in a way
that will give effect to the intention of the head of the company or prevent the
fragmentation of the shareholdings.103 This is true even when the actions of
company heads explicitly violate the letter of the company law.104 Article
201(1) of the Commercial Code, moreover, anticipates that share transfers may
take place on the books without the knowledge of transferees and provides that
in such cases, it is the actual shareholder, and not the nominal shareholder, who
has control of the company.105
Often family-owned companies also transfer shares or install directors to
the board of directors “in name only.” In addition to the above, such registration of nominal shareholders is done in order to satisfy the requirements of the
commercial law for incorporation, to give the company greater legitimacy on
paper, or to provide some form of symbolic recognition to non-family members
who have made substantial contributions to a family-owned company (such as
lifelong managers).106 It is commonly understood that the purpose of transfers
by a company head to his children is to plan for succession in the future, at the
time of the head’s death, and not to transfer control of the company in the
present. In fact, it is not unusual for the designated successor to remain una-

shareholders, not those shareholders formally listed on the registry, retain legal control. Nagoya Kōtō Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] April 24, 1991, Hei 2 (ne) no. 206, KŌTŌ
SAIBANSHO HANREISHŪ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, http://www.courts.go.jp.
103. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 9, 1972, Sho 43 (o) no. 232, 105 MINSHŪ 269;
see also Fukuoka Kōtō Saibansho [Fukuoka High Ct.] Oct. 31, 2002, Hei 14 (ne) no. 236,
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ 1, http://www.courts.go.jp.
104. See, e.g., Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Sept. 17, 1997, 1640 HANREI
JIHŌ [HANJI] 160.
105. The Japanese Commercial Code reads as follows:
A person who has taken shares using the name of a fictitious person shall incur the liability of a person taking shares. The same shall apply to a person who has taken shares in the
name of other person [sic] without his consent.

SHŌHŌ [SHŌHŌ] [COMM. C.] art. 201(1), translated in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2200, at 54
(2005). Book II of the Commercial Code, in which this paragraph appears, was abolished
when the Companies Act came into effect in 2006. See Kaishahō [Companies Act], Law No.
86 of 2005 (Hōrei teikyō dēta shisutemu [Hōrei DB]), http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi
bin/idxsearch.cgi (stating the rules of incorporation). However, the rule discussed here remains good law based on an analogy to Article 117(1) of the Civil Code, MINPŌ [MINPŌ]
[CIV. C.] art. 117(1). See EGASHIRA KENJIRŌ, KABUSHIKI-GAISHAHŌ [LAWS OF STOCK
CORPORATIONS] 94 (3d ed. 2009).
106. See, e.g., Komoto Ichiro, supra note 102 (discussing a case in which shares were
issued “in name only” to add legitimacy to the company).
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ware that the transfer has taken place until after the death of the company
head.107
Thus, the kinship relationship between Toru and Yoshiko is obviously central to their dispute. To understand their actions, we need to understand not only something about corporations in Japan, but something about the traditional
nature and economic activities of the Japanese household, the ie (literally
“house”). Unlike the common American conception of a family, an ie is a unit
engaged in a particular kind of business, often over generations (in theory at
least it should last in perpetuity, and many Japanese ie in fact do trace their lineage and their business back several centuries).108 Prior to U.S. occupationera legal reforms,109 the ie legally owned all assets collectively, as its own form
of legal personhood, and to this day household members extensively share assets that are nominally owned individually.
In contrast to the traditional middle-class Euro-American nuclear family
form of two sexually intimate individuals living together with their genetic
offspring, the Japanese ie has traditionally consisted of two political/economic
leadership “positions” or “offices”—the office of the clan head, and his
spouse/partner. The office of the clan head has traditionally brought with it authority over the family enterprise and control over its affairs as well as responsibility for managing those affairs.110 Only one person can hold this office at
one time, and therefore only one child in each generation can succeed to the office of clan head. Hence, succession is always a crucial but contestable matter
within the ie.111 The presumption traditionally has been that the clan head’s
oldest son succeeds his father in this position at his death.112 In practice, however, this rule of primogeniture is less important than the economic well-being
and survival of the ie. A clan head may choose as successor a second son who
seems more equipped to run the family business than his older brother; he may
107. Article 201(1) of the Japanese Commercial Code clearly anticipates that share
transfers may take place on the books without the knowledge of transferees, and that in such
cases it is the actual shareholder, and not the nominal shareholder, who has control of the
company and therefore should be held liable for its actions. See supra note 105.
108. See Jane M. Bachnik, Recruitment Strategies for Household Succession: Rethinking Japanese Household Organization, 18 MAN (n.s.) 160, 160-61(1983); cf. Shunji Sakai,
Communication et cohésion sociale dans les organisations japonaises [Communication and
Social Cohesion in Japanese Organizations], 38 SOCIÉTÉ 367, 371 (1992).
109. On the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II, see note 125 below.
110. See Bachnik, supra note 108, at 161.
111. Anthropologist Jane Bachnik describes the ie as “constantly ‘sorting’ between
temporary and permanent members”—between the ones who will succeed to the company
and the ones who will be forced out. Id. at 176.
112. Those who do not succeed to the office of clan head must set out on their own, or
are sent out to found “branches” of the ie (with economic support of their root ie). See
MATTHEWS MASAYUKI HAMABATA, CRESTED KIMONO: POWER AND LOVE IN THE JAPANESE
BUSINESS FAMILY 33 (1990). Typically this branch is engaged in some sort of economic activity that is related but subsidiary to the work of the root ie, such as the production of a
component part of the final product produced by the root ie.
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allow a daughter to assume control; he may bring in an outsider whose management skills he admires, by marrying him to a daughter;113 or he may adopt a
manager, in adulthood, as his “eldest son.”114 Therefore, although ie is often
translated as “household,” “family,” or “clan,”115 the ie is perhaps better understood as the Japanese analogue to the Euro-American corporation. Like the
corporation, the ie is a pool of wealth that exists in perpetuity with a unified
management structure that is nevertheless advised by others.116
This unique kinship relationship sometimes takes the form of an actual
corporate enterprise. The dōzoku gaisha (literally “lineage company”)117 is a
uniquely Japanese institution.118 Despite its formal legal existence as a corporation like any other, in the eyes of most Japanese, its corporate identity is a technical legal overlay on a very old and established social institution. The “lineage
company” is more lineage than company.119 The particular features of these
companies have contributed fundamentally to the economic success of Japan in
the postwar era. For example, the practice of “relational contracting” among
branch family companies engaged in a chain of production, in which each link
in the chain is willing to make sacrifices in its dealings with other links for the
sake of the long-term stability of relations among units, results in low transaction costs and a high degree of economic efficiency of the kind that can only be
113. When this occurs, the daughter traditionally keeps the household name and inherits
its assets. Id. at 45.
114. There is extensive discussion of this practice in the anthropological literature. See,
e.g., CHIE NAKANE, KINSHIP AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN RURAL JAPAN (1967); Bachnik, supra note 108; Harumi Befu, Corporate Emphasis and Patterns of Descent in the Japanese Family, in JAPANESE CULTURE: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS 34 (Robert J.
Smith & Richard K. Beardsley eds., 1962); Keith Brown, Dōzoku and the Ideology of Descent in Rural Japan, 68 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1129 (1966); Ichiro Kato, The Adoption of
Majors in Japan, in AN AGING WORLD: DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND SOCIAL
POLICY 161 (John M. Eekelaar & David Pearl eds., 1989); Howard Wimberley, On Living
With Your Past: Style and Structure Among Contemporary Japanese Merchant Families, 21
ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 423 (1973).
115. See Hironobu Kitaoji, The Structure of the Japanese Family, 73 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 1036, 1036 (1971).
116. Cf. Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative
Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (2000) (describing a similar phenomenon in Chinese kinship).
117. A dōzoku gaisha is defined by the corporate tax code as a company in which more
than fifty percent of the company’s shares are owned by no more than three shareholders and
their relatives, their “personal employees” (shionin) and their immediate families, and other
members of the households of the above. Hōjinzeihō [Corporate Taxation Act], Law No. 34
of 1965, art. 2, para. 10 (Hōrei DB), http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; cf. Kitano
Hirohisa, Dōzoku gaisha, 1069 SHŌJI HŌMU 39, 39 (1986). More commonly, the term is used
to mean an enterprise owned in substantial part by a Japanese clan, or ie.
118. As the sociologist Catherine Silver points out, Japan’s successful modernization
has not meant the Westernization of values. See Catherine B. Silver, Japanese and American
Identities: Values and Their Transmission in the Family, 72 SOC. INQUIRY 195, 195 (2002).
119. See DORINNE K. KONDO, CRAFTING SELVES: POWER, GENDER AND DISCOURSES OF
IDENTITY IN A JAPANESE WORKPLACE 167-68 (1990).
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achieved in Euro-American economies through very large economies of
scale.120 Such small and medium-sized companies make up the overwhelming
majority of all enterprises in Japan (99.7%).121 The vast majority of Japanese
employees (70.2%) also work for one of them.122 To say that these “companies” are “really” families in legal disguise therefore risks further confusion if
we have in mind a Euro-American conception of the family as a private sphere,
defined by relations of affection and set apart from the rough-and-tumble of
economic life. In point of fact, the Japanese household is already much more
like a business entity than a “family” in Euro-American conceptions of that
term.
Likewise, focusing solely on whether Toru’s state of mind conforms to
what the common law defines as “intent” to make a gift, or whether or not
transferring shares but continuing to exercise a degree of control constitutes
“delivery,” asks the decisionmaker to enter a make-believe world in which the
context of the parties’ relationships and the lenses through which they made
those choices simply do not exist.123 As Carol Rose argues, formal requirements reflect a wider cultural suspicion of gifts, a sense that rational people do
not intend to give things away for nothing in return, and a view that many gifts
are in fact the result of “theft” or “trickery” rather than freely given.124 We rely

120. See Ronald Dore, Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism, 34 BRIT. J. SOC.
459 (1983).
121. Share of SMEs in the Japanese Economy, SMALL & MEDIUM ENTERPRISE AGENCY,
http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/sme_english/outline/07/01.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012); see
also Ministry of Internal Affairs & Commc’ns, Establishment and Enterprise Census,
STATISTICS BUREAU (2008), http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/ListE.do?bid=000001008301
&cycode=0 (follow “Excel” hyperlinks adjacent to “Table No. 10”); Chusho kigyo kankei no
toikei shiryo [Statistical Data for Small and Medium-sized Companies], SMALL & MEDIUM
ENTERPRISE AGENCY, http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/pamflet/souran/3siryou/3-0-0-0-5toukei
.html#hyo2 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
122. Share of SMEs in the Japanese Economy, supra note 121; see also JAPAN SMALL
BUS. RESEARCH INST., MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE & INDUS., WHITE PAPER ON SMALL AND
MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN JAPAN, at v (2009), available at http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/
pamflet/hakusyo/h21/h21_1/2009hakusho_eng.pdf.
123. In practice, some courts have loosened the delivery requirement for gifts, especially when corporate shares are involved, introducing something more akin to a multifactored
analysis for determining whether there was indeed delivery and intent. But this more openended analysis is directed at only one question: what did the giver intend, and did she come
close enough to effectuating her intentions? Questions of culture and gender come in only as
a matter of evidence as to the parties’ state of mind. See, e.g., Jean v. Jean, 277 P. 313, 315
(Cal. 1929); Lynch v. Lynch, 12 P.2d 741, 743 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932); see also Yamaha
Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362, 375 (Ct. App. 1999); Jaffe
v. Carroll, 110 Cal. Rptr. 435, 439 (Ct. App. 1973).
124. See Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts
Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 303 (1992)
(arguing that the rigidity and formality in the law of wills reflects suspicion concerning the
legitimacy of gifts and anticipates the possibility of trickery or theft by the donee); see also
Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 2003) (exemplifying
the application of rigid rules for the validation of a gift in the context of a will).
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on formal doctrines such as “delivery” in the law of gifts because we assume
that the parties’ commonsense understanding of a gift involves some concept of
delivery. But in a situation in which the relevant law is not a stand-in for all the
relevant cultural considerations, whether Toru’s actions happen to match the
law’s requirements for “delivery,” for example, is almost fortuitous, and allowing the outcome of litigation to turn on such things turns the law into a game of
technical one-upmanship and chance.
A case in point: Toru’s claim that his gift fails for lack of delivery is ironic
given that under Japanese law, delivery is not a necessary element of a legally
recognizable gift. Mere intent alone suffices. Hence Toru is availing himself of
what, from a Japanese litigant’s point of view, is a technicality of American
common law doctrine.
2. The postcolonial dimension
But if this is not complicated enough, consider how this conflict incorporates and in some senses turns upon the effects and aftershocks of a colonial
legacy125 in which, as mentioned in Part I, tradition is often invented and reinvented, such that the search for the “true” Japanese or American custom on a
given point becomes largely futile. Even the fact that in Japanese law mere intent suffices for a gift (neither the gift contract nor the transfer of ownership requires delivery) may actually be a consequence of ideas adopted from continental European law.126 We are left with the fragments of many invented

125. The postwar U.S. occupation of Japan (1945-1952) was similar in function to colonization. As historian Eiji Takemae explains, despite the Americans’ reformist agenda, the
United States ran Japan for more than six years as a de facto military colony under General
Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. See TAKAMAE EIJI, INSIDE
GHQ: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN AND ITS LEGACY, at xxvi (Robert Ricketts & Sebastian Swann trans., 2002). According to the historian of international law Antony Anghie,
throughout its history the United States has declined to term its occupation of other countries
“colonialism,” instead using concepts like “trusteeship” to help resolve a fundamental contradiction: “how could the United States, born out of a war of independence against colonialism, itself become a colonial power?” ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND
THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283 n.40 (2005).
Although functionally similar to earlier European colonization projects, the ways and
means of the American use of power in Japan were distinct. The occupation of Japan and the
establishment of permanent naval bases in Okinawa represent the fulfillment of military
theorist Alfred Mahan’s vision for a U.S. foreign policy that “build[s] reach, not burdens.”
JOHN D. KELLY, THE AMERICAN GAME: CAPITALISM, DECOLONIZATION, GLOBAL
DOMINATION, AND BASEBALL 24 (2006). For an analysis of the Okinawa bases as colonization, see Kozue Akibayashi & Suzuyo Takazato, Okinawa: Women’s Struggle for Demilitarization, in THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS
243 (Catherine Lutz ed., 2009).
126. See MINPŌ arts. 176, 549. Japanese law is not fully clear on these questions. Under
Japanese law, a gift is a “consensual contract” (dakuseikeiyaku): a category of contract borrowed from Roman law which by definition requires nothing more than a meeting of the
minds. According to Article 549 of the Civil Code, a gift takes effect once there is mutual
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traditions, available to social actors as tools, levers, and lenses through which
to frame social and economic interactions, define personal aspirations, and ultimately negotiate conflicts.
In the corporate law context, the American occupation forces legislated the
ie out of existence in 1947, abolishing its status as a perpetual property holder
in the civil code and mandating the individualized division of property into
equal shares127 in a bid to strengthen individual autonomy in Japanese society.128 Three years later, the same occupation forces mandated an “Americanstyle” revision of the Japanese company law.129 The response was dramatic, as
companies rushed by the thousands to incorporate. What the occupation authorintent between both parties (expression of intent by the donor and acceptance by the donee),
and nothing further is required. Tsu Chihō Saibansho [Tsu Dist. Ct.] Dec. 4, 2003, Hei 15
(gyō u) no. 12, SAIBANREI JŌHŌ 1, http://www.courts.go.jp. For example, in Tōkyō Kōtō
Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Sept. 18, 2002, Hei 14 (gyō ko) no. 142, SAIBANREI JŌHŌ 1,
http://www.courts.go.jp, a father in Japan gave money to his daughter in the United States
and later contested the gift. The Tokyo High Court noted that, although the physical transfer
of the money occurred at a later point in time, the gift became effective when the father expressed his intent to advance the funds to his daughter and the daughter accepted. It is not
clear, however, whether this is due to European influence. According to some authors, the
bindingness is a consequence of traditional Japanese norms, according to which gifts were of
great importance and were usually considered binding. 14 SHINPAN CHŪSHAKU MINPŌ
[REVISED COMMENTARY ON THE CIVIL CODE] §§ 549-554 (Yunoki Kaoru & Takagi Takio
eds., 1993). In fact, articles 549 and 550 of the Code abolished the form requirement of the
Meiji period (which had resembled both French and German law) and merely allowed the
donor to cancel the gift if it was not in writing. MINPŌ art. 550; see Ronald Frank, Law of
Obligations, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, at 227, 248 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005).
Effectively, as in French law, the recipient’s position is less stable before than after delivery.
Tomotaka Fujita, Japan, in TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 261, 262-65
(Alexander von Ziegler et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011).
Note also that articles 549 and 550 of the Code concern only the obligation created by
the gift agreement, not the transfer of ownership. As concerns the need for delivery and for a
separate agreement on transfer of ownership, a conflict exists between two sources of the
Japanese Code: French law, where mere agreement suffices, and German law, which requires delivery and a separate agreement. See, e.g., Seizi Tanaka, On Theories About Alienation of Jus in Rem in the Civil Code of Japan, 5 OSAKA U. L. REV. 25, 25-26 (1957).
127. See Bachnik, supra note 108, at 160 (“[T]he ie, . . . although widely acknowledged
as the basic unit in Japanese society, was legislated out of existence by the Occupationinspired Civil Code of 1947.”); Karen Garner, Global Feminism and Postwar Reconstruction: The World YWCA Visitation to Occupied Japan, 1947, 15 J. WORLD HIST. 191, 215
(2004) (explaining that the American occupation forces mandated individual property rights
for women, which undermined the authority of the ie as collective property holder); see also
BEATE SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM: A MEMOIR 103-25 (1997) (providing background on the drafting of the equal rights provisions).
128. See Bachnik, supra note 108, at 169 (arguing that the problem with the Meiji Civil
Code from the point of view of the occupation forces was that it “clearly defines succession
as continuity of the ie and not individual continuity”).
129. Not surprisingly given this history, the corporation law does not treat dōzoku gaisha differently from other companies, and hence family-owned companies are formally subject to the same rules of incorporation as other corporations under the Commercial Code. See
generally Kaishahō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, arts. 25-103 (Hōrei DB),
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi (stating the rules of incorporation).
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ities perhaps missed in all this was that the new corporations were, in many
cases, the very ie they had banned three years before.130
The conflict between the parties to this case, then, is a postcolonial predicament—one framed by layers of occupation-era reform projects and local responses. And this recent history exemplifies how culture can be its own legal
invention: from the start, the company law in Japan served as a kind of local
tool, a euphemism, a way of putting things better left unsaid and of interacting
with the state and with others through the state—that is, as a technical game to
be played. It is not an exaggeration to say that the dōzoku gaisha is itself an artifact of the kind of legal technicalities that are the focus of this Article. This is
a complicated discovery: when we go looking for Japanese culture, in a multiculturalist vein, what we find instead are layers of history in which many actors
have deployed legal technicalities for their own purposes—not some pure culture outside of law, but legal technicalities in action.131
3.

The transnational dimension

As in most multiculturalism problems, it is not only that another culture is
at issue in the dispute between Toru and Yoshiko or that the other culture is
produced by an overlay of different normative, legal, and economic regimes. In
addition, the parties’ relationship is transnational in nature: structured and informed by more than one culture and competing conceptions of each. The interplay creates opportunity for differing understandings of what is right, just,
and desirable for each person and for the group as a whole—indeed, differing
understandings of the very facts involved. (For example, what exactly was the
nature of the agreement about this transfer? The parties actually have different
recollections and understandings on this point.)
The very existence of the conflict here reflects a transnational interplay of
cultures. In Japan, although disputes among rival successors are common at the
time of the death of the head of a family-owned company, legal disputes between the head of a family-owned company and other shareholders for control
of family-owned companies during the lifetime of the head are almost unheard
of, and the regulatory authorities do not treat this possibility as a serious policy
concern (as they do for inter-sibling conflicts). Most Japanese would find a
conflict between parents and children over business affairs to be highly unfortunate and many would assert that it is only rarely ethical for children to challenge a father’s authority during his lifetime, or for a father to sue his daugh130. It is also possible, of course, that the occupation government knew exactly what
was going on.
131. Our example is far from unique in this respect. Anthropologists have often documented how pluralist law becomes not simply a way of accommodating the truth about cultural practices, but rather a tool for continuing local politics by other means. Likewise, the
legal debates about multiculturalism unearth numerous examples of parties deploying legal
technicalities and conflicts between different legal regimes, in order to define their positions.
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ter.132 Thus, as is often the case in conflicts over multiculturalism, even the
party who is asserting an alternative cultural tradition in this conflict is not behaving entirely as that tradition might expect. After all, Toru has come all the
way to America to sue his daughter in a U.S. court of law. Toru is picking and
choosing, among fragmented and hybridized traditions, to fashion his own situated ethical position.
The issues here are further complicated by—indeed would not have arisen
at all were it not for—the opportunities and also the demands of a global economy. The very existence of this company is a product of Toru’s global business
model. Yoshiko in turn must satisfy potential creditors about the clarity of her
title (and hence the availability of her assets for seizure in bankruptcy) simply
in order to conduct business in the United States.
Finally, any attempt to unravel this controversy requires confronting the
pluralistic nature of national legal systems to begin with. Toru’s actions presume a certain appreciation (or at least interpretation) of how formal state law
in Japan accommodates norms regarding the administration of economic affairs
within family-owned companies. He is relying on a pluralistic understanding of
Japanese law and an assumption that state law delegates certain authority to
customary law.133
D. The Feminist Dimensions
From a feminist perspective, what is ultimately at stake in the conflict between Yoshiko and Toru is the gendered quality of the kinship hierarchies and
the power dynamics within the kin group that define economic membership and
frame personal choices, opportunities, and aspirations. The hypothetical pits a
daughter’s desire for economic and personal autonomy against a father’s desire
for respect and the continued economic and social viability of the household, in
the context of a cultural and legal tradition that places less emphasis on the individual rights of kinspersons than the Euro-American traditions do.
A basic context for this dispute is the reality that “Japanese female participation in management is considerably lower than in other industrialized nations, despite the fact that the female workforce in Japan is among the most
educated in the world.”134 In 2009, a mere 1.2% of executives at listed Japa-

132. Although it has been argued in Japanese legal studies that the Japanese are not in
fact less litigious than Americans, such arguments focus on litigation among strangers and
business relations, not among people who see themselves as kin.
133. For an explanation of delegation as one way that the state can accommodate nonstate law, see Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of
Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1234-35
(2005). On legal pluralism in Japan, see MASAJI CHIBA, LEGAL PLURALISM: TOWARD A
GENERAL THEORY THROUGH JAPANESE LEGAL CULTURE (1989).
134. Reginald Worthley et al., Workforce Motivation in Japan: An Examination of
Gender Differences and Management Perceptions, 20 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 1503,
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nese companies were women. As of 1995, the statistic was 0.15%. In comparison, in the United States, women held 13.5% of executive officer positions in
Fortune 500 companies in 2009.135 And yet in Japanese family-owned companies, the situation is more complicated. As Jean Renshaw argues,
It is accepted practice for wives in the large corporate families to be instrumental in decisions affecting leadership and succession, as they arrange
marriages, influence which son will become president, and often through their
own family bring greater wealth and power into the company. . . . As managers, [women] may be required to wield power directly, but so far they have
been quite successful at remaining invisible. As a person at the margins, a
woman manager truly straddles two worlds . . . . Those who spent early years
without a male sibling in first place felt less trepidation in seeking expanded
opportunities and trying out new behaviors.136

The irony, then, is that women in Japan fare better as leaders in those corporations that Western feminists might denounce as overtly patriarchal—
bastions of status rather than contractual relations. However, Renshaw adds,
whereas women in the West hit a “glass ceiling,” the “shoji screen” is a better
metaphor for capturing the nature of the discrimination that Japanese women
confront as managers: “The few women who break into top management are
invisible. . . . General opinion holds that there are no women managers. Shoji
screens serve to maintain a collective denial of Japanese women in positions of
power.”137
Moreover, in adjudicating legal disputes between members of familyowned companies, Japanese courts appear to give some weight to their judgments about the behavior and relative fault of each of the parties. Behavior that
deviates significantly from the relational and hierarchical standard of ethical
practice is rarely rewarded by the courts. Obedience to the company head, understood as “a generalized dutifulness, . . . [or] a relatively low level of individualistic self-assertion,”138 is the primary ethical imperative for company employees.139 This ethical imperative reflects a fundamental tenet of Confucian

1505 (2009) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); see also JEAN R. RENSHAW, KIMONO IN
THE BOARDROOM: THE INVISIBLE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE WOMEN MANAGERS 17-18 (1999);
Masae Yuasa, Japanese Women in Management: Getting Closer to “Realities” in Japan, 11
ASIA PAC. BUS. REV. 195 (2005); Frank Upham, Clarke Lecture at Cornell Law School: Resistible Force Meets Malleable Object: The Story of the “Introduction” of Norms of Gender
Equality into Japanese Employment Practice (Apr. 26, 2011). Some recent studies nevertheless suggest that Japanese women’s preference for management positions is on the rise. See,
e.g., Worthley et al., supra, at 1504.
135. Juro Osawa, Japan Investors: Why No Women, Foreigners in the Boardroom?,
WALL ST. J. JAPAN REAL TIME (June 30, 2010, 7:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
japanrealtime/2010/06/30/japan-investors-why-no-women-foreigners-in-the-boardroom.
136. RENSHAW, supra note 134, at 120-21.
137. Id. at 139.
138. Dore, supra note 120, at 471.
139. See Ernest Gundling, Ethics and Working with the Japanese: The Entrepreneur
and the “Elite Course,” CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 1991, at 25, 30.
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ideology that children must honor their parents and juniors must honor their seniors.
Yet, for the most part, the conflict between Yoshiko and Toru would not
even appear on the feminism/culture radar. As already noted, Western feminists
have been criticized for the tendency to prioritize culture as the source of women’s oppression and leave unaddressed the role of economics in constructing
women’s identities and concerns.140 However, it should not be assumed that
focusing on economics instead means putting aside the feminism/culture debate; even issues of corporate law can return us to the debate. As Vasuki Nesiah put it in the context of third world feminism, “the putative distinction between the economic and the cultural is itself another moment in the production
of each—a denial of the culture of economy and the economics of culture.”141
Consider, for example, our treatment of this conflict as an issue of gift law.
Adding a cultural dimension to the analysis revealed what seems like a conflict
at the level of the rule between Japanese law, which does not have a delivery
requirement for a gift, and California law, which has very clear formalistic requirements. However, Carol Rose reminds us that law and tradition reflect the
gendered nature of gift giving in American culture.142 If the “quintessential
gift” is one “motivated by generosity and a spirit of selfless love without
thought of reciprocity,”143 and such gifts are associated particularly with women, one might expect courts to find, for example, that daughters who care for
their fathers throughout their lives are not entitled to compensation from their
fathers’ estates because their work was simply a “labor of love”—a free and
selfless gift. On that theory, then, what seems like a conflict between Japanese
law and California law at the level of the rule may turn out in its application to
be no conflict at all, as judges in both societies seem more willing to favor the
interests of fathers over those of daughters in the specific arena of fatherdaughter gifts.
What of our treatment of the conflict between Yoshiko and Toru under
corporate law? Conflicts that fall into the doctrinal bucket of corporate law
have only rarely captured feminist attention.144 In addition, feminists and multiculturalists alike would most likely fall in line with the mainstream doctrinal

140. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; cf. NANCY FRASER, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Postsocialist” Age, in JUSTICE
INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE “POSTSOCIALIST” CONDITION 11 (1997); Lila
Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 783 (2002).
141. Nesiah, supra note 13, at 141 (footnote omitted).
142. See Rose, supra note 124, at 301.
143. Id. at 302.
144. See Kellye Y. Testy, Capitalism and Freedom—For Whom?: Feminist Legal
Theory and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 87,
96.
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view that what is at stake here are simple garden-variety arm’s-length transactions.
Recall that introducing a cultural dimension into the corporate law analysis
of our hypothetical revealed the presumption that the eldest son will succeed
his father as head of a dōzoku gaisha, or Japanese lineage company.145 In our
case, it is Toru’s son who would eventually own and run the parent company
while Yoshiko would own and run the smaller American subsidiary. Given the
presumption of male primogeniture, it is perhaps not surprising that American
feminists, in fact, intervened against the ie after World War II. Closer inspection of the postcolonial dimension reveals that American occupation forces in
Japan legislated the ie out of existence at the urging of American feminists
within the ranks of the occupation bureaucracy, who became convinced that the
Japanese household was a patriarchal institution. And indeed, as is much commented on by Japanese feminists, the ie has been in decline since the American
reforms. But the feminist theorist Chizuko Ueno argues that the rise of the nuclear family as a result of American reforms aimed at creating “salary men” and
“housewives” has led to the widespread repression of women in Japan in ways
heretofore unknown in Japanese society.146 These developments underline
another point made by those who fault Western feminists for making practices
like veiling and clitoridectomy their primary target; namely, that the focus on
an “exotic” culture as the culprit misses the ways in which feminists themselves
are implicated in the production of gender inequalities in the non-Western
world.147
The feminist dimensions of our example are more complex and indeterminate still.148 On the one hand, the mainstream doctrinal view that Yoshiko’s relationship to Toru is legally irrelevant chimes with Western liberal feminist
struggles that count as precious victories the recognition that women’s legal
status should be independent of their family status.149 On the other, as against
the atomistic and generalized view of the self taken by American law, many

145. See RENSHAW, supra note 134, at 162 (finding, based on a sociological study, that
in Japanese family-owned companies, “[w]omen with brothers are not as likely to head their
family businesses”).
146. UENO CHIZUKO, KINDAI KAZOKU NO SEIRITSU TO SHŪEN [THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
DEMISE OF THE MODERN FAMILY] (1994).
147. See, e.g., L. Amede Obiora, Feminism, Globalization, and Culture: After Beijing, 4
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 355, 372-73 (1997). An economic example often given is the
fact that Western women’s ability to work outside the home has relied on non-Western
women taking up some of their traditional homemaker roles. See, e.g., Ruba Salih, Toward
an Understanding of Transnationalism and Gender, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 69, at 231, 235 (discussing Moroccan migrant women in Italy).
148. See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology
and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
149. For an annotated bibliography, see Claudia Zaher, When a Woman’s Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status: A Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 459 (2002).
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cultural feminists have asserted a concept of the social or relational self.150 This
reconception of the self fundamentally acknowledges the part that the particularities of relationships play in constituting self-identity and the meaning of individual lives, and it argues for recognizing in law the role of these relationships.
Along cultural feminist lines, Terry O’Neill has argued for applying an
“ethic of care” to corporate law: “Feminist scholars point out that the capacity
to respond to the needs of others is a core aspect of being human. A feminist
understanding of corporate law thus recognizes that this aspect of human nature
operates in corporate relations as well as in intimate, personal relations.”151 Although O’Neill is not writing about corporate relations that are, in fact, also intimate, personal relations, her approach would arguably not disregard that Toru
and Yoshiko are father and daughter.
The culture of the household in our example as both corporation and kinship highlights a more general contrast between O’Neill’s feminist analysis of
corporate law, which would approach the corporation more like a family, and
feminist family law scholars who treat the family more like a corporation.
Many important feminist projects resist the carving out of family law from laws
governing the market—they insist on recognizing household work as work, for
example.152 In light of the ie’s history, it is striking that Janet Halley and Kerry
Rittich, among others, argue for the household over the family as the best unit
of analysis for comparative family law and for family law tout court.153
Finally, the feminist dimension adds further nuance to the transnational
dimension of our hypothetical case. As noted earlier, the issues here would not
have come into existence at all were it not for a global economy. While feminist scholarship on globalization tends to concentrate on the ways in which the
demands of globalization reinforce inequalities of gender and race, some of this
scholarship also identifies globalization’s potential to challenge women’s socioeconomic positions by “allowing women to become economic providers for

150. See, e.g., ANNETTE C. BAIER, MORAL PREJUDICES 24-32 (1994); VIRGINIA HELD,
FEMINIST MORALITY: TRANSFORMING CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS 57-63 (1993);
CATHERINE KELLER, FROM A BROKEN WEB: SEPARATION, SEXISM, AND SELF 1-4 (1986); Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community, in FEMINISM
AND POLITICAL THEORY 143, 143-44 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990), Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 8-9
(1989).
151. Terry A. O’Neill, Gender and Corporate Personhood: A Feminist Response to
David Millon, 2 STAN. AGORA 77, 83 (2001).
152. See, for instance, the American Journal of Comparative Law’s recent Special Issue
on Comparative Family Law, and especially the introduction by Janet Halley and Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010).
153. See id. at 755-60.
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themselves and for their transnational networks.”154 California law gave Yoshiko an opportunity to assert her control of the American subsidiary as against
Japanese expectations of her as a dutiful daughter. Likewise, Toru’s global
business model together with the gendered differences in Japanese and U.S.
corporate culture gave Toru an opportunity both to reject the Japanese cultural
presumption that his son would be his sole successor and also to have Yoshiko
work in the United States, where the mentality toward female executives has
changed more than in Japan.
Thus, although our private law hypothetical about a transfer of shares may,
at first, have looked quite remote from the feminism/culture debate, it turns out
to be an example of the same conflict found in familiar cases like veils and polygamous marriages, which are usually treated as raising questions for public
law. Our hypothetical is perhaps more dizzying than these easily recognizable
cases because even before we reach the matter of cultural difference, a decisionmaker may have different intuitions about the problem depending on
whether we choose to see the collectivity at issue here as a family or as a company.
If we are facing a company, hierarchy is of little concern as long as it pertains to matters of company affairs (personalized hierarchy of course is harassment) or as long as employees of equal rank are afforded roughly equal rights
and responsibilities. If this is a company, Yoshiko’s unhappiness with her father’s control—even if any reasonable person would be unhappy with her
boss’s interference—is really of little legal concern. On the other hand, if this is
a company, we also imagine the relations between the parties as arm’s-length
transactions, and we do not hesitate to hold them to the letter of their bargains.
So if Toru wanted to retain control, he should have bargained for it explicitly.
But if this is a family, then hierarchy comes to look like a much more pernicious matter of tradition-bound, gendered, and age-based pressure, if not oppression. Yoshiko comes to look much more like someone in need of saving by
the law. At the same time, if this is a family then we might be far more sympathetic to Toru’s assertion that the legal documents do not tell the whole story of
the obligations and arrangements between the parties.
In sum, the dispute between Toru and Yoshiko can be seen as a classic feminist conundrum of the public/private distinction, as it grafts onto diverse bodies of law, mutates, disperses, and reorganizes in new forms in the process of
crossing legal and cultural boundaries. In this context, we also begin to see the
interaction of law and culture as really a matter of the parties playing with law,
154. Chantal Thomas, Migrant Domestic Workers in Egypt: A Case Study of the Economic Family in Global Context, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 987, 1020 (2010); see SARAH
GAMMAGE ET AL., TRADE IMPACT REVIEW: FRAMEWORK FOR GENDER ASSESSMENTS OF
TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 41 (2002); Kerry Rittich, Black Sites: Locating the
Family and Family Law in Development, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1023, 1025 (2010); Saskia Sassen, Women’s Burden: Counter-Geographies of Globalization and the Feminization of Survival, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 255 (2002); Thomas, supra, at 1020-22.
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and with culture, as national laws become available as moves in a recursive set
of conflicts and hierarchies.
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF A CONFLICTS APPROACH: INTRODUCING
TECHNICALITIES
In this Part, we work through our hypothetical once more, this time in accordance with a conflict of laws analysis. A traditional choice of law analysis in
conflicts155 might proceed through the following steps. Having determined that
it has jurisdiction over the dispute in question, the court would first take notice
of the existence of a “foreign element” to the case, usually by way of the pleading and proof of foreign law submitted by the parties.156 Second, it would characterize the issue or issues involved.157 For example, is a dispute about allocating property between divorcing spouses a matter of family law, of property
law, or even of contract law if the spouses had a prenuptial agreement? Third,
the court would identify the relevant connecting factors for each issue depending on the characterization,158 and fourth, it would determine which law applies
to the issue according to the particular choice of law methodology in use in that
jurisdiction.159 If the issue is characterized as title in stock and transfer of
shares, for instance, then according to the traditional choice of law rules, the
connecting factor is the place where the corporation is incorporated and the applicable law is the law of that place.160 Fifth, if the prevailing choice of law
methodology points to the law of another jurisdiction, the court would consider
whether the public policy exception bars the application of that law.161 Sixth,
the court would apply that law to the particular issue.
Our aim, however, is not to establish that our example is really a conflicts
case about whether Japanese or Californian law, as the law of states, applies.
Rather, it is to illustrate the value of conflicts as an intellectual style and, in
particular, to show that this style offers a way to reveal and do justice to the
complicated issues of gender, law, and culture our example raises without becoming bogged down. As such, we depart from standard conflict of laws in
three ways. First, although conflicts as a discipline is traditionally concerned
only with state-made law, we assume that conflicts analysis can, at least in
theory, be applied to questions of overlap among any normative communi-

On the distinction between jurisdiction and choice of law, see infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Parts III.B.3, III.B.4.
Cf. Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc., No. 81 C 305, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17611, at
*4-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1981) (holding that a corporation organized under U.S. law is a U.S.
corporation for Title VII purposes, even if it is a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese corporation).
161. See infra Part III.B.5.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
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ties.162 Second, our discussion modifies slightly the order of the choice of law
steps just listed so as to bring out their correspondence with issues in the feminist debates about multiculturalism. We start with the steps that capture and operationalize key insights from the debate, and then proceed to the steps that go
further and thus reveal fresh possibilities. For the same reason, while this Part
is organized to correspond to the steps in a standard choice of law analysis, we
name and describe each step as an intellectual move, which is a third difference. Our interest is in asking how thinking through feminism/culture problems
analogically, as if they were technical conflicts questions,163 might open up
new avenues of theorizing. In other words, the conflicts doctrines we discuss
are not simply tools for resolving disputes, although—and this is the trick—that
is precisely how they are structured. Rather, they are first and foremost tools
with which to think.
A. Capturing the Insights of the Feminism/Culture Debate
1. Seeing culture—the “foreign element”
Our first conflicts move is to notice that the dispute between Toru and Yoshiko has several connections to Japan and its law and culture (in addition to its
obvious connections to California). In a substantive law analysis—whether applying California’s corporate law, trust law, or law of gifts—such cultural considerations are more often than not a mere afterthought. In contrast, conflicts
starts with the question of which culture should provide the relevant substantive
norms. Thus the very existence of the field, writ large, serves as a constant reminder that there are other frameworks of understanding any particular normative question and ours is only one among them. This was similarly the cultural
relativists’ critique of an Okin-style framing of the debate as feminism versus
culture. They rejected the underlying assumption that “‘culture’ is what nonliberal peoples are . . . ruled and ordered by,” or more expressively, that “we are
a democracy while they are a culture.”164
Here, both parties are Japanese citizens; the parent company is Japanese;
one of the parties was in Japan when he negotiated and signed all agreements
and transfer documents; and both parties signed original versions in Japanese.
Furthermore, if indeed there was agreement on a “name-only” transfer of
shares, this agreement references and arguably even represents a tacit choice of
Japanese law.
Although these connections might ultimately not be controlling in a standard conflict of laws analysis, the point is that by attending to the “foreign ele162. See Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1105 (2005).
163. See infra Part IV.
164. BROWN, supra note 40, at 150-51; see discussion supra Part I.B.
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ment,” conflicts requires us to see culture, so to speak. We recognize, for example, that what seems like a quirky twist on the traditional corporate law
problem in this conflict—the fusion of kin and corporation—is in fact the norm
rather than the exception in Japan. And for the conflicts approach it also matters that from the point of view of the Japanese state, whose interests the California forum must consider in modern conflicts doctrine, this kin group as corporation is a crucial building block of the economy. Thus, Toru’s decision
seems less irrational when seen against Japanese, rather than Californian, expectations. The distinctions between a corporation and a family seem more fluid and contingent. Family ties seem to carry broader significance than we might
otherwise have thought.
Unlike a straight corporate law analysis, then, the conflicts lens forces at
least some degree of attention to the nature of collectivity and agency within
the Japanese household, and thus to the questions of hierarchy and gender described in Part II. This in turn demands attention to what forms of contestation
are possible within kin groups/economic collectives.
2. Culture and agency—pleading and proving foreign law
In common law conflict of laws, the parties must plead an issue of foreign
law. If it is not pleaded then the law of the forum is applied.165 In contrast, in
most civil law countries, the court itself takes judicial notice of foreign law
whether or not it is pleaded by the parties.166 The common law approach to
proof of foreign law has been criticized for allowing the parties to defeat proper
outcomes by choosing not to plead the foreign law or doing a bad job of proving it. But in the context of a reflexive approach to truth questions, the value of
this party autonomy lies in the agency it gives the parties to decide whether to
situate themselves within one culture or another on a particular issue. This
choice resonates with the relativist critique of Western feminists’ tendency to
assume that non-Western women are defined by their culture rather than exercising any degree of choice within it. It also resonates with the post-essentialist
culture-minimizing position taken by Anne Phillips, for example, that if culture
is invented tradition, then a defensible multiculturalism will put human agency
much more at the center.
At common law, and to this day in many common law jurisdictions, the
parties must usually also prove foreign law through the introduction of expert
evidence.167 Traditionally, the judge cannot determine the foreign law for her165. See 1 DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 255 (Lawrence Collins ed., 14th ed. 2006); PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 602-03 (5th ed. 2010); 1
JANET WALKER, CASTEL & WALKER: CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 7 (6th ed. 2005).
166. See Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg, Foreign Law in National Courts: A Comparative
Perspective, 304 RECUEIL DES COURS 181, 272-73, 289-91 (2003). For an overview of the
issue, see generally id. passim.
167. See supra note 165.
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self, but must consult those with more situated knowledge. More recently, in
many U.S. jurisdictions the judge can conduct her own inquiry into foreign law,
but the results of this inquiry have the ambiguous status of quasi-fact.168 Since
foreign law is a question of quasi-fact to be ascertained through expert testimony or comparative legal research, the judge cannot presume to interpret or apply the foreign law based solely on her expert vantage point.169 Likewise, the
court’s decision about the nature of foreign law has no precedential value either
for the foreign jurisdiction or for the meaning of the foreign law in the court’s
jurisdiction.170 Stamped into these doctrines, then, is an appreciation for the
difficulties of understanding other cultures. They also give expression to a core
feminist concern for giving respect for the “other.”171
In more mechanical conflicts analyses, unfortunately, the deceptively simple question “What is the rule in each jurisdiction?” is often treated as a mere
afterthought.172 As a consequence, what U.S. judges apply is often not truly the
foreign law but instead some virtual law, the result of expert witness testimony
(often crafted in one party’s favor).173 But this is to miss much of the revelatory
potential of a conflicts approach. Treating proof of foreign law as a simple mechanical question papers over the norms at issue for each community implicated by the case. The testimony of the parties’ experts or the judge’s own research can seek to describe the foreign law as more than a collection of blackletter rules: it can direct attention to the subtleties of institutional arrangements,

168. See Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 631-34 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Posner, J., concurring) (criticizing the use of expert testimony to establish foreign law); see
also Gregory S. Alexander, The Application and Avoidance of Foreign Law in the Law of
Conflicts, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 602 (1975).
169. But see Bodum, 621 F.3d at 633 (Posner, J., concurring) (“When the testimony
concerns a scientific or other technical issue, it may be unreasonable to expect a judge to resolve the issue without the aid of such testimony. But judges are experts on law, and there is
an abundance of published materials, in the form of treatises, law review articles, statutes,
and cases . . . to provide neutral illumination of issues of foreign law.”). Compare Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Die Auslegung und Fortbildung ausländischen Rechts [Interpretation
and Development of Foreign Law], 116 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS 3, 19-44 (2003), on
the ideal of a foreign law perspective.
170. But see Jansen & Michaels, supra note 169, at 52 (suggesting that courts, when interpreting their own law, should pay attention to interpretations of that law given by foreign
courts).
171. See discussion supra Parts I.B, I.D.
172. This relative lack of interest is in strong opposition to the relevance that proof of
foreign law has in practice, especially where the designated law is that of a foreign nation.
For example, U.S. courts have traditionally shown great unease with Japanese law. Judge
Posner remarked in one decision that “the law applicable to the issues in the case is almost
certainly Japanese law, with which American judges have little familiarity. In fact, as we
said, even the lawyers in this case, though their clients are Japanese firms, have little familiarity with Japanese law.” U.S.O. Corp. v. Mizuho Holding Co., 547 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir.
2008).
173. For recent criticism of the role of experts in proving foreign law, see Bodum, 621
F.3d at 629.
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policy choices, and interactions between law on the books and law in action.174
In our hypothetical dispute, for example, a decisionmaker who looked no further than the letter of the Japanese company law would find no substantive difference between the laws of Japan and California on the question of whether
ownership of shares confers control over those shares. And yet a more subtle
and inquisitive decisionmaker might follow up on Toru’s assertion that the
transfer was “in name only,” and hence would learn that unlike in California,
there is some sort of legal practice in Japan—a practice of quasi-formal legal
status—called “name-only” shareholding.
The rules on proving foreign law are intended to establish what the foreign
law is, and in this sense conflict of laws on the surface seems to succumb to
cultural essentialism. Nonetheless, the adversarial nature of this truth quest encodes the post-essentialist idea that the truth of foreign law is contestable and
that what is established is a product of both competing testimony by foreign
law experts and the judge’s perspective on that testimony. Whereas the need to
plead foreign law corresponds to a commitment to respect women’s choices
about their relationship to their culture and to the post-essentialist recognition
that what their issue-by-issue choices produce may be a cultural hybrid, the
need to prove foreign law presents women with an opportunity to articulate
their account of their community’s norms. This corresponds to the sort of culture-transforming positions taken by post-essentialist legal feminists like Madhavi Sunder. Indeed, the first of Sunder’s three procedural prescriptions is that
instead of privileging the (male) elite’s account of the community’s norms, legal decisionmakers should place elites and dissenters on an equal footing when
a dispute is brought to them.175 But, as called for by anthropologist Saba Mahmood’s work on the politics of piety among Egyptian women,176 party autonomy in conflicts also guards against the assumption that women will necessarily offer more egalitarian accounts of their culture. Imagine, in our example, that
Yoshiko accepted, in the alternative, that Japanese law applied to the dispute.
She might want to lay the ground for the public policy exception to choice of
law177 by proving that “name-only” shareholding is bound up with the discriminatory norm that the eldest son succeeds his father as the head of the ie. And
Toru might counter by seeking to establish one of the other accounts we described in Part II: that in practice women may exert considerable power behind
the scenes in Japanese family-owned companies, that the norm of male primogeniture is less important than the economic well-being and survival of the ie,
that globalization has eroded the norm of male primogeniture, or that Toru’s
global business model avoids the norm by planning to leave Yoshiko the com-

174.
175.
176.
177.

Cf. id. at 638-39 (Wood, J., concurring).
Sunder, supra note 53, at 1466-67.
See MAHMOOD, supra note 67, at 2-4, 10-14.
See infra Part III.B.5.
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pany’s subsidiary in a country where she faces less discrimination as a female
executive.
While the parties’ experts or the judge’s own research can seek to describe
the foreign law as more than a collection of black-letter rules, the judge nevertheless cannot choose the more progressive account of the foreign law if that is
not her best assessment of the law as it is. Thus, while competing testimony can
open up space for such accounts, the judge’s task also responds to feminists
who caution that the recognition that culture is made, and can therefore be unmade or remade, should not obscure the power dynamics that perpetuate a culture in its current institutional form.
B. Revealing New Possibilities
In the previous Subpart we described how certain doctrines in conflict of
laws capture and operationalize important insights of the feminism/culture debate. We now want to show how other conflicts doctrines go beyond the current
debate and thus press us to theorize it in more complex ways.
1. Splitting the power to decide from the question of whether to defer
to another normative community—jurisdiction and choice of law
In the very first move of seeing culture in the dispute, we are also effectuating a powerful analytical shift that is everyday business in conflict of laws
but quite counterintuitive elsewhere. We are splitting jurisdictional questions
from choice of law questions—or at least acknowledging that they might be
different and indeed that each might be governed by a different set of rules and
norms. In other words, we are acknowledging that just because an authority has
the power to impose its value system on all the parties does not necessarily
mean that it must or should do so. It can exercise jurisdiction and still remain
open to the possibility that it might defer to another body of law—another normative system. Or, put the other way around, we are acknowledging that even
if an authority does not provide the applicable body of law, it may still exercise
its power of jurisdiction to ensure an adequate forum.
The distinctiveness of this approach is perhaps clearer when contrasted
with Ayelet Shachar’s federalism-style approach to conflicts between feminist
and multiculturalist values.178 Shachar’s proposal involves dividing up jurisdiction over a given issue, to give some authority to the minority community to
effectuate its cultural values and some authority to the majority to effectuate
feminist concerns. In a case like Lovelace, for example, Shachar would divide
questions of membership from questions of resources; she might grant the indigenous community the power to decide whether Sandra Lovelace regains her
Indian status when her marriage to a non-Indian ends in divorce, and grant the
178. See SHACHAR, supra note 77, at 117-45.
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encompassing state the authority to determine what access Lovelace would
have to resources allocated to Indians.179 Shachar argues that the advantage of
creating such “multicultural jurisdictions” is that neither community’s authority
could trump the other’s. This division, she argues, preserves a powerful element of cultural autonomy while also giving women in the group leverage to
advocate for change from within. It should be added that this division also depends on the indigenous community having a decisional authority and one that
appears adequate to the question allocated.
With respect to our hypothetical we might ask, as Shachar does in formulating her proposal, whether a California court really should hear Toru’s claim
(or parts of his claim) at all. Perhaps it should defer to a Japanese tribunal on,
say, the family law issues at stake. But Shachar’s type of analysis would stop
here. That is, if California asserts jurisdiction with regard to a particular issue,
it applies its own law to that issue. Conversely, if Japan hears an issue, it applies Japanese norms.
Conflicts doctrine envisages another possibility. It splits off the question of
who has authority to decide (jurisdiction) from the question of which normative
community’s values should apply (choice of law). Even assuming that California has the authority to hear the claim, conflicts doctrine insists that there is a
further question of deference to be asked. In thinking through the dispute,
should California, via its courts, defer to the values of another political community? Or on the other side of the coin, assuming that another political community’s values apply, should California decline to hear the claim? Even if no
other forum exists, for instance? The key possibility opened up by the move we
term “splitting” is that the California court might take jurisdiction and yet
choose to effectuate Japanese cultural norms rather than Californian norms—
or, as we will see, apply Japanese cultural norms to some issues and Californian norms to others.
In fact, the jurisdictional question has yet a further dimension. Under a
doctrine known as forum non conveniens, the California court might have jurisdiction but nevertheless defer to Japan if Japan also has jurisdiction. One of
the factors considered is whether the law of the other jurisdiction applies
(which means that jurisdiction and choice of law are not entirely split off from
one another).180 However, the applicable law is only one of several factors for
forum non conveniens, and frequently not the decisive one. More importantly,
in light of concerns about the availability and nature of the actual institutional
channels through which women can contest interpretations of their culture,
dismissal can be granted only if an adequate alternative forum exists. In other
179. Cf. id. at 119-22. Shachar discusses a similar U.S. case, Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). SHACHAR, supra note 77, at 18-20, 142 n.51. On Martinez, see
also Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989).
180. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
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words, dismissal can be granted only if the foreign community provides for a
decisional institution and a fair hearing can be expected from that institution,
making it defensible to refer the parties to that institution instead.
2. “As if” (I)—characterization
Most techniques and approaches for determining whether and to what extent foreign law applies to a dispute begin with characterization—the evaluation of the nature of the legal question. The dispute between Toru and Yoshiko
could be characterized in a number of ways. If it is characterized as a matter of
corporate law, the crucial legal question is whether the transfer documents conferred upon Yoshiko full rights to control or some lesser set of rights. If characterized instead as a matter of the law of gifts, the dispute turns on whether Toru
“gave” the shares to Yoshiko and if he did, what legal rights and obligations
ensue. Finally, if the dispute is characterized as a matter of family law, then the
crucial question is what power Toru has to structure Yoshiko’s choices, opportunities and assets, both for now and for the future when he will no longer be
the head of the family.
Characterization, of course, is not unique to conflict of laws. As will be apparent, at least two of these possible characterizations map onto possible substantive law theories of the case. And, in the feminist context, the innovation of
Shachar’s multicultural-jurisdictions approach rests on what is essentially a
characterization question (in her example, is the issue of divorce one of membership or resources?).181
What is unique to characterization in conflicts, however, is a combination
of two features: self-reflexivity paired with what we will call an “as if” modality. As to the first, the very structure of a conflicts problem is reflexive because,
as explained above, a conflict of laws by definition involves two or more legal
systems imagined as laterally rather than hierarchically related to one another.182 Conflicts recognizes that even the initial characterization of the issue
must take place from the situated viewpoint of one system or another. There is
no “view from nowhere” that can be used to capture the legal essence of the institution or conflict in question. Similarly, much feminist analysis, informed by
the insights of cultural relativism, will quickly recognize in our hypothetical the
need to be suspicious of our immediate instincts about the cultural and legal
facts. As we saw in Part II, at issue is a company that is actually a family, in a
cultural context in which family is more like the forum legal system’s conception of a company to begin with.

181. See SHACHAR, supra note 77, at 131-32.
182. Even when a conflict involves political units that are hierarchically arranged, such

as a conflict between state law and customary law, the conflicts move is to think more laterally about the relationship between the two.
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In contrast, although Shachar’s approach divides jurisdiction between the
minority community and the larger state based on characterization of the issue,
she leaves unexamined whether a given issue can be said in essence to have one
character or another. Also unexamined is the possibility that the community
and the state might disagree on the characterization of a given issue, perhaps
precisely because of their different cultural standpoints. In other words, Shachar grants the decisionmaker (the judge or bureaucrat, as agents of one interested party, the state) the power to characterize without coming to terms with
how the characterization of an issue is in itself a highly loaded cultural practice
about which there may be significant and legitimate disagreement. Moreover,
as conflicts scholars know well, the characterization of a dispute one chooses
may ultimately dictate the outcome.
Thus the reflexive orientation of conflicts shares with the most sophisticated feminist critiques of multiculturalism a deep, persistent, and framing
awareness of the situatedness of one’s claims. In this sense, conflicts thoroughly absorbs the relativist critique that emerged in response to the Okin-style
framing of the debate as equality versus culture. Yet if such feminist theory
tends to bog down in reflexivity, the response of conflicts as a field is dramatically different. The decisionmaker makes her own characterization, while fully
recognizing that other jurisdictions implicated in the case might characterize
the issues differently. The conflicts approach is to say, for example, “We call
this transaction a matter of family law, recognizing all the while that it would
also have been perfectly legitimate to frame it as a matter of property law.”
Characterization is in this sense not a truth claim; it is a provisional technique
for resolving a very real clash of values, an “as if.” This stance has a certain resonance with the idea of positionality found in more general feminist theory,
which acknowledges truth as situated, partial, and therefore provisional, but
nevertheless as a basis for feminist commitment and political action.183
Conflicts’ open acknowledgement of the normative situatedness of characterization, it should be added, is a function of the field’s history. Characterization was a prime target in the early twentieth-century realist critique of traditional conflict of laws.184 First, characterization was critiqued as ontologically

183. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 880-86

(1990).

184. See Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20
COLUM. L. REV. 247 (1920); see also Walter Wheeler Cook, “Characterization” in the Conflict of Laws, 51 YALE L.J. 191, 194 (1941); Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743 (1941). The
criticism of ontological naïveté is justified only insofar as characterization is viewed as a
way to determine the “true” nature of an issue—in other words, as an ontological claim. Although language in judicial opinions occasionally suggests such an (ill-fated) search for a
“true nature,” a proper understanding of characterization, and the one prevalent in Europe
and arguably also in the United States, does not make such ontological claims. Instead, characterization is functional. GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS SCHURIG, INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT [PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] 346-56 (9th ed. 2004).
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naive. No issue is, ontologically speaking, “tort” or “contract”—it becomes a
matter of tort or contract because actual legal thinkers choose to frame it as
such. The critics argued that the assumption that there were “right answers” to
characterization questions concealed underlying policy considerations guiding
the judicial determination of the applicable law, since the choice of characterization often dictated outcomes.185 Second, and relatedly, characterization was
portrayed as an “escape device”: according to the critique, judges faced with
unpalatable outcomes to their choice of law analysis could simply
(re)characterize the issues in order to avoid the application of an undesired
law.186 The sedimenting of these critiques over the last century has meant that
when conflicts specialists characterize, they do so with a deep sensitivity to the
fact that there is no single “right answer” to the characterization question.
3. Slicing issue by issue—dépeçage
Conflicts takes the foregoing analysis one step further. To give one example, assume we characterize our hypothetical dispute between Toru and Yoshiko as a general matter of corporate law. Under the conflicts doctrine of
dépeçage (from the French dépecer, meaning “to carve up”), we might then decide to apply Japanese corporate law to the substantive question of whether the
transfer of shares transferred both ownership and control or only ownership, but
to slice out the subquestion of whether Toru’s subjective understanding of the
transfer is relevant. This subquestion could in turn be characterized as a procedural question concerning when exceptions to the parol evidence rule should be
entertained, and the forum might choose to apply its own procedural law to that
question even as it recognizes that Japanese norms should govern the general
question of whether control is separable from ownership of shares.
As the example of dépeçage illustrates, the ingenious insight of conflicts is
that we can gain purchase on a clash of cultures by slicing it down issue by issue. Two societies may have conflicting views of women’s authority over religious affairs but not over economic affairs, for instance. Although this insight
is commonsensical among conflicts specialists, it is worth pausing to understand how avant-garde it is, theoretically speaking: When faced with a clash of
normative values—a clash between, say, certain liberal feminist values and certain other values—one need not decide which trumps in the abstract or in general. One can focus rather on the specific legal question at hand and slice the
problem down, recognizing that one normative system might trump for some
purposes, and another might trump for other purposes.
To illustrate further, if we characterize our hypothetical dispute as a question of gift law, then the general question is whether this gift gave Yoshiko the
185. See Cook, supra note 184, at 200-01.
186. Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959

DUKE L.J. 171, 175.
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power to do as she wishes with the company. This legal question about power
and control in the context of hierarchical kinship relations raises dilemmas for
feminism/culture analysis. As we saw, the common law’s suspicion of gifts,
embodied in its formal delivery requirements, reflects a general preference for
“contract” relations over “status” relations, and for arm’s-length transfers over
gifts in which the quid pro quo is not clearly defined. Part of the normative underpinning of the common law rules, therefore, is a concern for the inequalities
of bargaining power and the potential for exploitation that inheres in gift economies.
However, an inquiry into the requirements for making a gift in Japan
would reveal an important legal fact: the strong emphasis on delivery as a necessary element for effectuating a gift under California law—upon which Toru
hangs his substantive legal claim that the transfer was invalid—does not exist
under Japanese law.187 The Japanese law’s lack of suspicion about gifts, embodied in its lack of a formal delivery rule or insistence on notarization,188 expresses a very different normative paradigm: namely, that the pooling of resources and noncontractual forms of exchange are expected and normatively
favored, and hierarchy is not necessarily equated with exploitation. But this
simple normative clash between Japanese and California gift law looks even
more complicated if we consider that one of the key insights of feminist legal
scholarship has been to bring attention to the normative value of altruism, sharing, and relational and affective forms of economic transactions.
Conflicts doctrine differs crucially from much of the feminism/culture debate in that it does not seek to resolve the question of whether gifts are more or
less patriarchal and exploitative than contracts as a general matter. It directs our
attention only to this particular gift, between these particular parties. Thus one
might ask whether this particular gift was exploitative or empowering of Yoshiko. And here, the parties actually agree: Toru testifies that his intent was
precisely to empower Yoshiko in a context in which he feared that she might
lose out to her brother. Likewise, Yoshiko interprets this gift as a source of her
power and authority to act independently. There is, in fact, no conflict about the
normative question in this case. The insight here—at once highly practical and
deeply profound—in turn reflects a subtle recognition that no single value system can possibly have all the answers all the time; indeed, the insight is that to
allow any one system to win out in absolute terms would often be unwise at
best and unjust at worst.
Like philosophical pragmatism189 or practical reasoning in legal femin190
then, conflicts takes on the particularities of the individual case. The
ism,

187. See supra note 126.
188. But see J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC

APPROACH 46-47 (1999).
189. See, e.g., AMÉLIE OKSENBERG RORTY, MIND IN ACTION 274 (1988), quoted in Bartlett, supra note 183, at 851 n.82.
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technical approach differs from pragmatism in a number of ways, however. For
example, conflicts does not attempt to resolve the case at large, taking all factors into account at once; instead, it slices the issues up to create manageable
smaller units to be combined later.
Practically speaking, this slicing move also gives us a handle on the potentially endless complexity of deep reflexivity. The judge need not have a full
understanding of the foreign culture. Her task, at the end of the day, is not to
say what the gift ultimately means in Japan or how the corporation is intertwined with the family.191 The judge’s task, instead, is to decide the limited
question of whether Yoshiko or Toru should have the ultimate right to render
decisions for this corporation.
4. “As if” (II)—as if the conflict could disappear
But perhaps the most shocking move in conflicts—and the one that is most
controversial in the discipline itself—is the move simply to act “as if” the conflict of values was not a conflict at all. The European and American traditions
perform this move in different ways, but each achieves similar miraculous results and is subject to similar political and theoretical criticisms. In U.S. conflict of laws, one standard move when faced with an apparent clash of cultural
values is to question whether, notwithstanding the fact that the conflict may
suggest such a clash, the interests at stake in effectuating those values are not
actually in conflict in this case. The move here is to introduce a key concept into the debate—the notion of disinterestedness. The term “false conflict” refers
to the situation where there is a conflict at a general normative or legal level,
but there is not actually a conflict between the laws as applied to this particular
dispute, because no more than one jurisdiction is actually interested in seeing
its norms effectuated in this particular case.192
For example, if we characterize this dispute as a matter of gift law, then we
find that Toru is asking the court to apply California law to this issue, and is
arguing that his gift failed because under California law delivery is required to
effectuate a gift, and the fact that he retained control over the shares meant that
the shares were not in fact delivered. Yoshiko, meanwhile, is asserting that Japanese law should apply to this issue because under Japanese law delivery is not
a necessary element of a legally recognizable gift.
At a surface level, there is most definitely a conflict between Japanese and
California gift law, since the laws differ. Yet the U.S. conflicts lawyer next
190. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 183, at 849; Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist
and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990).
191. Cf. Marilyn Strathern, A Community of Critics? Thoughts on New Knowledge, 12
J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 191, 204 (2006) (“[J]udges in truth do not distort
anthropological knowledge, for it is not placed before the courts as knowledge in which they
need to have any informed interest.”).
192. HAY ET AL., supra note 165, at 30 & n.15.
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proceeds to ask, “Is there actually a conflict as concerns the application of these
laws to this particular dispute?” In order to answer this question, we first ask
whom California law, with its stringent delivery requirements, aims to protect.
The answer is that it aims to protect gift givers from being tricked or manipulated into giving something away against their better judgment. On the other
hand, whom does Japanese law, with its lack of such requirements, aim to protect? The answer arguably is the reverse—gift receivers who have relied on
promises from gift givers. Now in this case, the gift receiver has made her life
in California, where she lives and works, and Japan therefore has relatively little interest in protecting her. Conversely, the gift giver is a Japanese national
living in Japan, and California has relatively little interest in him. Thus both jurisdictions are in fact disinterested in seeing their own law applied, and an actual conflict does not exist.193
This is another difference between a conflicts paradigm and Shachar’s multicultural-jurisdictions paradigm, which divides up the balance of authority between the state and the cultural group and sticks to the terms of this bargain regardless of the specifics of the concrete dispute. Conflicts, in contrast,
recognizes that even if as a general matter a jurisdiction should have authority
in a particular area, in some cases that jurisdiction may not have an interest in
applying its law. Why, for example, should we apply a group’s patriarchal
membership rules if it turns out that the group is indifferent to whether they are
applied in the given case?
Now it will be obvious that this kind of interest analysis involves something of a sleight of hand. To say that California law’s delivery requirements
only aim to protect gift givers and that Japan’s lack of such requirements aims
to protect gift receivers is an “as if” assertion. That is, although it is not necessarily false, it is not necessarily true, and it cannot be refuted.194 Nevertheless,
if we act “as if” this assertion holds, the conflict disappears in this particular
case.
In the civil law tradition, in which state interests do not play as prominent a
role in conflicts analysis, other “as if” devices are available. In German conflict
of laws, for example, the court might resort to the “as if” that what the parties
actually had in mind was a “name-only” transfer of the shares, as a way to
maintain both the corporation and the family. The doctrine of “acting under the
wrong law” (Handeln unter falschem Recht),195 as it is called, is intended to
account for situations in which parties set up their legal affairs with a law in
mind other than the one that actually applies. In such situations, foreign law is

193. Technically, a case in which neither jurisdiction has an interest is termed an “unprovided for” case, and the term “false conflict” is reserved for cases in which only one jurisdiction has an interest in applying its law. See id.
194. See infra Part IV.
195. KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 184; see also CORNELIA MÜNZER, HANDELN UNTER
FALSCHEM RECHT (1992).
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not actually applied, but is taken into account. Examples include cases in which
officers of a corporation acted as though it were an English corporation even
though, under German principles of choice of law, the applicable law remained
German law.196 Now, given that the civil law tradition is far more focused on
individual rights than on state interests, it is no surprise that the German method of “acting as if the conflict disappears” focuses much more on an “as if”
ascription of the parties’ intent. And again, this is not to say that such intent is
necessarily false—it may well have been what Toru and Yoshiko intended. But
again, this doctrine is open to the same kind of challenge: What does it mean to
say the parties intended one thing and did another? Why would they now dispute this? The fuzziness of this doctrine is precisely what makes it an attractive
technique for tackling cultural conflicts.197
More importantly, this doctrine captures something powerful about how
individuals who move across borders experience culture clash, something we
might term “transposition.” Individuals do not always mix and match cultures
through deliberate acts of choice. Instead, individuals transpose cultures, only
semiconsciously seeing one culture through the lens of another, understanding
and organizing their lives in accordance with a system of norms from elsewhere. This is different from the idea of hybridity, ubiquitous in postessentialist debates about feminism and culture, which emphasizes the blending
of cultural elements. The “acting under the wrong law” doctrine, in contrast,
draws attention to how actors knowingly or unknowingly shift or superimpose
cultural elements.
5. The ethical moment—public policy
The final step in a conflict of laws analysis picks up the recognition that
there must be a decision—an ethical moment, as we called it in our discussion
of Susan Moller Okin’s framing of the issue as equality versus culture. Ordinarily, conflicts proceeds to apply the chosen law to the relevant issues. However
in some rare cases, an adjudicator may invoke a “public policy exception” and
refuse to do so because if the foreign law were applied, it would violate core
elements of the forum’s values. The public policy exception has been used, for
example, to avoid the recognition of polygamous or gay marriages, or to avoid
application of foreign laws that discriminate against women. The existence of
the public policy exception is a way of asking the “how different is too different” question, which, as explained above, is so immediate and so central to dis-

196. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 1, 2002,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 204, 2002.
197. Erik Jayme, Identité culturelle et intégration: le droit international privé postmoderne [Cultural Identity and Integration: Postmodern Private International Law], 251
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 120-21 (1996).
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cussions about the right compromise or balance to be struck between feminist
values and respect for cultural autonomy.
The public policy exception is considered exceptional, and many critics
have supported its use only in situations in which the application of foreign law
would violate a fundamental principle of local justice.198 By contrast, some
commentators have embraced the public policy exception as a normatively legitimate doctrine reflecting the adjudicator’s primary obligation to give effect to
the norms of her own community.199 Nevertheless, this step of the conflicts
analysis is important because it represents an ethical moment in which the decisionmaker decides to decide, so to speak. Even when the public policy exception is invisible, because the dispute is resolved without recourse to it, the existence of the exception means that the decisionmaker has chosen not to apply it,
and hence the ethical moment is always reached. Thus, unlike some interventions in the feminism/culture literature, conflicts does not end on a note of critique or complexity; it ultimately decides.
At the same time, it is also important to recognize that the public policy
exception does not permit compromise or balancing. If the conflict is fundamental, the judge’s only choice is not to apply foreign law to the issue at hand.
Thus, conflicts ultimately does not have room for policy compromise. Compromise is not its style.
Nor is dialogue, in the potentially transformative sense of some direct
commentary on the foreign law. The public policy exception does not rest on
some values claimed to be objective, but explicitly on the values of the deciding court’s community. For the exception to apply, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the forum’s public policy is violated. The exception thus leaves unanswered whether the practice in question is objectionable in some objective
sense, and whether it should be changed in the foreign culture.
While this final step represents an ethical moment, the feel here is quite unlike the Okin-style framing of ethical moments. We have already shown how
through the processual layering of its techniques, conflicts analysis systematically defers and thus ironically often ultimately resolves the opposition between
feminism and culture. Although the public policy question always appears at
the end, it need not bear all of the weight.
Moreover, if the judge does reach the public policy question, its treatment
holds still further opportunities to narrow or resolve the opposition between
feminism and culture. The judge may approach the potential conflict with public policy in the concrete rather than in the abstract (dealing only with this particular case rather than the foreign law in general). For example, recognizing
polygamy in general may be oppressive to women, but recognizing a polygamous union between particular parties may not be oppressive with respect to par198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 cmt. c (1971).
199. Cf. LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL, III ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 160 (5th ed.

2001).
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ticular issues, such as inheritance rights.200 In addition, the public policy analysis may involve a reflexive exercise akin to relativist critiques of feminists like
Okin: the judge must interrogate her own community’s laws to determine
whether the public policy conflict is deep-seated and fundamental, or is superficial and belies an underlying similarity.201

IV. “AS IF”: LEGAL THEORY THROUGH TECHNIQUE
To be clear, we are not suggesting that every feminism/culture problem
should be turned into an actual doctrinal conflicts problem, or that theorists of
feminism and culture need to become conflicts lawyers. What interests us here
is how legal theory might be revitalized if it took on board some of the ethos,
the habitus, the style of conflicts, as a modality of theorizing.
In seeing conflict of laws as fruitful for understanding, structuring, or dealing with value pluralism202 or legal pluralism,203 our argument allies with recent work by several other scholars. For those authors, however, the promise of
conflicts lies in the big picture summoned up by more fashionable policydriven approaches to the field and typical of public law, whereas for us, its
promise is largely in the démodées techniques typical of traditional private
law.204 The legal techniques we have described emanate from historical traditions of argument and interpretation, and are learned and taught through practices of professionalization varying from formalized legal education to guildlike mentorship. One important dimension of this set of skills and evaluative
criteria is a sense of constraint: only certain uses of the tools, certain arguments, and certain analogies will do when thinking through political problems.

200. Different European countries have taken different public policy approaches to recognizing the dissolution of a marriage abroad based on the husband’s unilateral request. See
Marie-Claire Foblets, The Admissibility of Repudiation: Recent Developments in Dutch,
French and Belgian Private International Law, 5 HAWWA 10 (2007).
201. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp.
2d 1181, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (engaging in reflexive analysis of the way its decision might
be perceived abroad before ruling that the First Amendment right to free speech trumps
French bans on racist speech), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.
2006).
202. See Martha Minow & Joseph William Singer, In Favor of Foxes: Pluralism as
Fact and Aid to the Pursuit of Justice, 90 B.U. L. REV. 903, 909-16 (2010).
203. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155
(2007) [hereinafter Berman, Global Legal Pluralism]; Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal
Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 225 (2009) [hereinafter Berman, The New Legal Pluralism]; Jayme, supra note 197; Horatia Muir Watt, Experiences from Europe: Legal Diversity and the Internal Market, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429 (2004); see also Ralf Michaels, Global
Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 248-49 (2009).
204. Cf. Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking On the
Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 976-77 (2005) [hereinafter Riles, A New Agenda]; Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2008, at 273.
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Another is a practical sense that one’s own professional agency, with respect to
any particular problem, is constrained at least to some degree by the possibilities and the limitations of one’s tools. All of this adds up to a particular habitus,
a particular modality of thinking through political problems, in which the tools
are in the foreground, no matter how large or unwieldy the political conflict
might be. We term this mode “theory through technique,” to capture the affect,
and aesthetics, through which theoretical problems are captured and processed.
Before moving to the implications of our argument for the impasse in feminism, we want to address a likely objection to our argument so far: does our
fascination with the wondrous possibilities of the technical not ignore how
technicalities often obscure or dilute political conflict?205 After all, the key insight of legal realism was precisely that technical legal form sanitizes social
conflict, turning real questions of whose interests should be favored—the interests of, say, fathers and daughters—into technical questions of, say, the transjurisdictional enforceability of gift agreements. And of course, conflict of laws
comes with its own baggage: it bears responsibility, arguably, for upholding
slavery and for tolerating and even furthering Nazi laws, all under the veil of
formalist considerations like sovereignty and the equivalence of different private law rules.206
One version of the objection might note that our interest in private law
techniques rather than more administrative and managerial approaches to multicultural accommodation exaggerates the divide between public and private,
and ignores the ways in which private law moves are always intricately enmeshed in public law regimes of administration, regulation, and enforcement.207 Indeed, the public/private distinction has long attracted these sorts of
critiques from feminists.208
Another version of the critique might query the unintended consequences
of the techniques we have described. The experience of many colonial societies
with the importation of seemingly neutral private law demonstrates how devices such as property-recording systems or background contract rules can become

205. See, e.g., PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 111-12 (1998). For a detailed response to Schlag’s critique of the direction we take here, see Annelise Riles, Is the
Law Hopeful?, in HOPE IN THE ECONOMY (Hirokazu Miyazaki & Richard Swedberg eds.,
forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 16-20), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1408522.
206. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND
COMITY 3-4 (1981); David Fraser, “This Is Not Like Any Other Legal Question”: A Brief
History of Nazi Law Before U.K. and U.S. Courts, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 59 (2003).
207. See Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 110 (1989) (arguing
that the policy in favor of validating private contracts “oversimplifies contract law by failing
to recognize that different states may have differing judgments about what the intent of the
parties—their justified expectation—actually was, or whether enforcement would contravene
forum policies regulating freedom of contract”).
208. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1992).
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tools of hegemony and exploitation.209 Likewise, feminists have demonstrated
that these consequences persist in international development assistance
projects—even those specifically aimed at “investing in women.”210 On the
other hand, as Prabha Kotiswaran has shown for the case of sex workers in
Calcutta, very large questions of women’s welfare often turn on technical differences in background local laws governing landlord-tenant relations.211 How
can one tell whether technologies are “good” or “bad”? How do we know
whether these techniques we have described open up space for a new kind of
political contestation or shut that space down?
A related possible objection to our argument, emerging out of the legal
realist tradition, concerns the malleability of legal technique. As discussed earlier in the context of characterization, the field of conflicts was, in fact, the
showcase for the legal realist demonstration that formal legal rules do not constrain ethical decisionmaking—because rules are subject to multiple levels of
exceptions, because choices must be made between competing rules, because
there is ambiguity in how facts should be related to applicable rules, because
the content of rules is subject to contestation in the process of analogizing the
facts at hand to existing case law or in the hermeneutics of statutory interpretation, and much more.212 The technical doctrine of conflicts, in this view, is
largely incoherent, and judges manipulate it at will to reach whatever results
they wish to reach.213 From this point of view, what we need is not more emphasis on the technical, but more honest conversation about the political conflicts and choices at stake.214 Another related concern might be that conflicts
methods fail to wrestle adequately with the indeterminacy of culture. The
process of finding foreign law seems to make truth claims about domestic or
foreign cultures that are in fact highly contestable and highly politicized representations.

209. See BERNARD S. COHN, The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South
Asia, in AN ANTHROPOLOGIST AMONG THE HISTORIANS AND OTHER ESSAYS 224, 241 (1987);
TIMOTHY MITCHELL, RULE OF EXPERTS: EGYPT, TECHNO-POLITICS, MODERNITY 57-58, 76
(2002).
210. See, e.g., Rittich, supra note 154, at 1025, 1040.
211. See PRABHA KOTISWARAN, DANGEROUS SEX, INVISIBLE LABOR: SEX WORK AND
THE LAW IN INDIA 158-71 (2011).
212. See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV.
173, 183-87 (1933); cf. Cook, supra note 184, at 200-02; Walter Wheeler Cook, “Immovables” and the “Law” of the “Situs”: A Study in the Ambiguity of Legal Terminology, 52
HARV. L. REV. 1246, 1249, 1258 (1939).
213. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some
Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232, 1233 (1997). But cf. Christopher
A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719,
764-77 (2009) (presenting empirical evidence that different approaches to choice of law do
lead to somewhat predictable outcomes). See generally Michael H. Gottesman, Adrift on the
Sea of Indeterminacy, 75 IND. L.J. 527 (2000).
214. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 207, at 6.

KNOP, MICHAELS & RILES 64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (DO NOT DELETE)

March 2012]

CULTURE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS

3/9/2012 5:18 PM

645

These critiques are not wrong in our view. It is just that they fail to appreciate the extent to which practitioners of conflicts reasoning are aware of the
limitations of their tools. Hence, the critiques miss the creative paradox of conflicts reasoning as self-conscious impossibility.
Consider, for example, the problem of proving foreign law. As we saw in
our hypothetical case, it was far from clear what the “law of Japan” was on the
status of “name-only” gifts. Ask three experts and you are likely to get three
answers.215 The problem the legal decisionmaker encounters here is precisely
the invention-of-tradition problem: there is no singular thing called “Japanese
culture” or “Japanese law.” There are only competing norms, competing interests, and competing interpretive traditions and institutions. When Toru asks the
court to honor Japanese law, therefore, he is also simultaneously making a discursive claim for a particular version of Japanese law and cultural tradition, one
Yoshiko might contest. So as legal realist critics might point out, even this simple technical step of “finding and proving foreign law” turns out to be a highly
malleable, highly contested, even relatively incoherent mess.
Conflict of laws is hardly naive about these challenges and limitations,
however, as we have already seen with characterization. On the contrary, almost every conflicts textbook dutifully walks students through the manipulability of doctrine, the impossible double binds, and the incoherence and multiplicity of rules. In the United States, not only was conflicts one of the premier
doctrinal sites of the legal realist revolution, those revolutionaries—Cook, Lorenzen, Yntema, Cavers—remain the revered icons of the field.216 Far from
having a case of critical amnesia, the discipline today is an improbable mix of
doctrinal tools paired with normative and practical critiques of those tools. The
discipline comes prepackaged with its own critiques.
What we have then is a discipline that asks its practitioners to selfconsciously engage in an impossible exercise: to find foreign law, recognizing
that there is really no such thing to be found. And yet the judge must do the impossible, recognizing that it is an impossibility: she must ultimately find the
foreign law to be this or that.
This move of doing the impossible, knowing full well that it is impossible,
is not unique to conflicts. It is one of the key modalities of private law reasoning.217 Borrowing from Hans Vaihinger, Lon Fuller named this modality “asif” legal thought.218 In The Philosophy of “As If,”219 Vaihinger defined an “as
215. For a famous example from Germany, involving seven competing expert opinions,
see BGH Jan. 21, 1991, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1418, 1991. For a critique of the futile hope of gaining objective truth from expert opinions, see Jansen & Michaels, supra note 169, at 14.
216. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 92-100
(2008).
217. See generally RILES, supra note 15.
218. L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (pt. 1), 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 390 (1930); see also L.L.
Fuller, Legal Fictions (pt. 2), 25 ILL. L. REV. 513 (1930).
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if” as knowledge that is consciously false and hence, for this very reason, irrefutable.220 Such “as ifs,” he argued, enable forms of agreement and imagination
in all aspects of knowledge.221 In mathematics, for example, the concept of a
line is an “as if,” since mathematicians work with lines as one-dimensional
while knowing that such infinitely thin lines do not exist in reality. And yet acting “as if” there is such a thing as a line in the mathematical sense allows for all
of the insights of geometry.222 Likewise, a legal fiction differs from a hypothesis because it cannot be proved or disproved.223 Vaihinger draws attention to
the delicate epistemological stance of the “as if”—to its subtle, ambivalent
“tension.” The “as if” is neither true nor not true, he insisted, but rather is itself
the tension between what is true and not true.224 It is this tension, for Vaihinger,
that is the fountain of all growth in knowledge: “The ‘As if’ world, which is
formed in this manner, the world of the ‘unreal’ is just as important as the
world of the so-called real or actual (in the ordinary sense of the word); indeed
it is far more important for ethics and aesthetics.”225 Vaihinger calls for remaining open to what he terms the “as if” quality of knowledge rather than critiquing its distance from reality: “We can only say that objective phenomena
can be regarded as if they behaved in such and such a way, and there is absolutely no justification for assuming any dogmatic attitude and changing the ‘as
if’ into a ‘that.’”226
In the context of the problems of representation, cultural description, and
hybridity that pervade debates about feminism and multiculturalism, this “as if”
modality has a special salience. Unlike even postmodern feminists who fashion
vocabulary after vocabulary to try to capture the hybrid, polyphonic, fluid character of cosmopolitan cultural life, as though the latest vocabulary could finally nail it, conflicts takes a different tack on the same problem: it willfully abandons the project of describing the “truth” about culture. Conflicts turns its back
on truth not by refusing to “find the law,” but by finding it in an “as if” modality: that is, conflicts recognizes all the while (crucially) that its own representations about, say, Japanese law or culture, are only fictions.
The contribution of conflicts to the debates and problems of multiculturalism, then, is the suggestion that we act “as if” it were possible to turn an irresolvable political conflict into a narrowly tailored and technically specific

219. H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF “AS IF”: A SYSTEM OF THE THEORETICAL,
PRACTICAL AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND (C.K. Ogden trans., 2d ed. reprint 1949)
(1911).
220. See, e.g., id. at 86-88.
221. See id. at xli, xlv-xlvii.
222. See id. at 222-27.
223. See Fuller (pt. 1), supra note 218, at 367; see also Riles, supra note 205, at 4.
224. See VAIHINGER, supra note 219, at 125-26.
225. Riles, supra note 205, at 7 (quoting H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF “AS IF,” at
xlvii (C.K. Ogden trans., 1924) (1911)).
226. VAIHINGER, supra note 219, at 31.
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one.227 We do not resolve the question of whether feminist values trump other
normative concerns, or even whether, say, the rights of girls to education trump
other local economic imperatives. We seek only to answer the question of
whether this particular claim should be heard with respect to these parties and
these specific issues according to this particular set of doctrinal categories.
One way of thinking about this approach is as an “as if” constraint of legal
form.228 The insight of conflicts methodologies is that the tools sometimes exceed themselves, if we allow them to do so. It may be that limiting the possibilities at one methodological or disciplinary level creates inadvertent surprises,
unexpected discoveries in other places. For legal scholars and lawyers this
means recommitting to law, as opposed to, say, popular culture, or cultural
theory, or fiction, as a medium of social change.
However, and importantly, this submission to the constraint of this legal
form is always done with full realization that the issues cannot really be cordoned off this way—that they are in fact related to many other problems, and
conflicts, and doctrines, and political imaginations. It is done with full appreciation that indeed the very question of how you slice—how you characterize the
issues—is highly malleable. Hence it is crucial that the “as if” modality of engagement with legal technique never devolve into blind formalism. As Vaihinger insists, one must fight to maintain the uncomfortable tension of “as if” and
not allow it to devolve into “is,” or even worse, into “ought.” This suggests
how the “as if” modality of legal technique can be its own kind of ethical
commitment in the context of the shifting terrain of cosmopolitan politics. The
point of form is not, in other words, to avoid questions of values and politics,
but the exact opposite: to provide us with a language within which to formulate,
assess, and ultimately resolve, at least for the specific case, clashes of values
that would remain irresoluble if taken in another way.
Indeed, in conflicts, the merely “as if” nature of the constraint of form is
expressed doctrinally in the availability of the public policy exception as a necessary element of ethical choice at the close of the analysis. There will come a
point at which the “as if” must stop. But as we argued in the previous Subpart,
we think it is significant that this moment occurs at the end of the analysis, after
the techniques have had their moment of agency.
What we are calling legal theory as technique, then, is an approach to politics that is purposely oblique for the moment. To paraphrase a comment made
to us by Chantal Thomas, it is an approach that (temporarily) tries out the indeterminacy of formalism as a respite from the up-front and head-on certainty of
politics. In this respect, “as if” thinking is very different from, say, narrative or
contextualizing modalities of thought that dominate feminist and cultural
theory. Professionalism at the level of the constraint of form allows for a cer227. Cf. Robyn Wiegman, Feminism’s Apocalyptic Futures, 31 NEW LITERARY HIST.
805, 822 (2000) (calling for “feminism in the meantime”).
228. See infra note 236.
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tain creative amateurism, or experimentation, at the level of the political and
cultural encounter.
V. FEMINISM AS TECHNIQUE
The problem of culture is a central problem for feminist legal theory. Thus
far, this Article has sought to demonstrate how the conflict of laws mode might
respond. We are also intrigued by the implications of responding in this mode
for feminist legal theory writ large. What we would like to call “feminism as
technique” is appealing to us in part because it refuses to dissolve the opposition between feminist values and cultural concerns through any of the three
common strategies introduced in Part I, namely dialogue, tolerance, and compromise. In this Part, we join with important voices who have raised doubts
about some or all of these commitments and show how conflicts offers one picture of an alternative.
A. No Dialogue, No Tolerance, No Compromise
1. No dialogue
As described earlier, faced with conflicting political positions or cultural
communities, many feminist approaches stage a dialogue of one kind or another
between differently situated women.229 In the context of cultural relativism and
the self-reflexive recognition that “we” and “they” both face the dilemma of
culturally conditioned choice,230 the dialogue may aim simply at shared understanding. In comparison, feminists drawing on the post-essentialist conception
of culture as “invented tradition” often ascribe transformational value to institutional arrangements or procedural solutions aimed at dialogue, arguing that
they will bring the particular cultural community’s norms into closer alignment
with gender equality.231 For these feminists, the idea that culture is already a
fluid, contested, and changing set of values and practices implies that transformation is not at odds with respect for culture.
In contrast, one of the core insights of poststructuralist, queer, and postcolonial feminisms is that dialogue with dignity is not always possible, and demanding dialogue can have its own unintended and hegemonic consequences.232 For example, the legal philosopher Mikhail Xifaras argues that the
notion of dialogue with the “other” through law partakes of an imperial “Na-

229. See, e.g., HOLTMAAT & NABER, supra note 33, at 3 & n.14, 87-89; Sunder, supra
note 69, at 902.
230. See supra Part I.B.
231. See supra Part I.D.
232. See generally MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND
POSSIBILITIES OF MODERN LAW 86 (2005).
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poleonic” ideal in which “others” are slowly incorporated and rationalized
through legal discourse. For Xifaras, following Rancière on this point, dissensus and struggle are fundamental to politics, and hence proposals for dialogue
that posit even a fantasy of the end of dissensus are in fact dangerously apolitical.233
While the conflicts approach to multiculturalism may in fact achieve
shared understandings and enable uncanny alliances—that is, while it may in
fact foster dialogue—it does not explicitly aim to do so. Its objectives are much
more modest and far less utopian. It aims only to bring the current dispute to an
(equitable and legally defensible) end.
It is not that conflicts as a field is uninterested in dialogue, mutual understanding, and reciprocity. It is that it chooses to come at these questions sideways—by foregrounding other more technical legal questions. To illustrate, a
false conflicts analysis may indeed generate deference to foreign law.234 And
the very process of going through a false conflicts analysis ideally demands
carefully contextualized attention to the purposes and scope of foreign law.
Hence, the orientation of the analysis is quite different from the view now advocated by some prominent legal theorists that an understanding of the “other”
in legal terms is ultimately impossible and even irrelevant as a normative goal
because legal discourse and practice simply translate everything outside themselves into their own existing categories, and therefore serious engagement
with the “other” need not be attempted at all.235 But although this encounter
with the “other” may turn out to be expansive, it is nevertheless framed as a
matter of narrow doctrinal manipulation in order to reach a specific legal end.
Ironically, we believe, it is the narrow lens, the “constraint of form”236 described in Part IV, that ultimately allows for the breadth of the encounter.
2. No tolerance
Another core value implicitly or explicitly underlying much of the multiculturalism debate is tolerance.237 In Regulating Aversion, Wendy Brown articulates a powerful critique of the seemingly benign emphasis on tolerance of
233. Mikhail Xifaras, Professor of Pub. Law, Sciences Po, Research Seminar: Is Global
Law Universal (Jan. 31, 2011); cf. JACQUES RANCIÈRE, DISSENSUS: ON POLITICS AND
AESTHETICS 37-40 (2010) (discussing dissensus).
234. See HAY ET AL., supra note 165, at 31 (“[I]n false conflicts, Currie would apply the
law of the only interested state . . . .”).
235. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Cannibalizing Epistemes:
Will Modern Law Protect Traditional Cultural Expressions?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 17, 19 (Christoph
Beat Graber & Mira Burri-Nenova eds., 2008).
236. See MARILYN STRATHERN, THE GENDER OF THE GIFT: PROBLEMS WITH WOMEN AND
PROBLEMS WITH SOCIETY IN MELANESIA 180-82 (1988) (describing the efficacy of the “constraint of form”).
237. See SHACHAR, supra note 77, at 10.
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other value systems in American political life.238 The surface-level egalitarian
ethos of tolerance, Brown points out, hides a pernicious hierarchy: one only tolerates those whom one believes to be in some sense inferior to oneself.239
Martha Minow likewise has illustrated how “tolerance presents the dilemma of
its own limits.”240 As she puts it, “Liberal tolerance has always struck me as a
second-best, a kind of ‘putting up with’ difference that falls short of genuine
respect. Tolerance implies an imbalance of power: some have the power to
grant—or withhold—tolerance toward others.”241
From a different vantage point, the anthropologist James Weiner has critiqued the essentialist underpinnings of tolerance.242 Echoing the insights of the
invented-tradition literature, he reminds us that the very differences that get the
debate over multiculturalism going are often products of the interventions of
the state law apparatus through the “tremendous burgeoning of the institutional
relationships, buttressings, laws, procedures, and so on, between any indigenous community and . . . governments, companies, [and] non-government organisations.”243 If one truly takes this insight seriously, Weiner argues, then the
very idea of recognition and tolerance is somewhat nonsensical since the differences to be tolerated are actually products of the institutions of toleration.244
One of the attractions of the conflicts approach in our view is that tolerance
is simply not part of its vocabulary. Of course, as in the case of dialogue, conflicts may result in tolerance of a kind: the forum may choose to defer to another value system even on issues of deep concern to the forum’s own political
community. As Weiner suggests, the technical machinations of state law generate their own cultural effects.245 Yet conflicts does not aim at toleration.246 It
aims at resolving a particular conflict.

238. BROWN, supra note 40.
239. See id. at 22-24.
240. Martha Minow, Tolerance in an Age of Terror, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 453,

461 (2007).
241. Id. at 457.
242. See James Weiner, Eliciting Customary Law, 7 ASIA PAC. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 15
(2006).
243. Id. at 18.
244. See id. at 17.
245. See id. at 22.
246. The doctrine of comity arguably gives some voice to values of tolerance. For a critique of tolerance in the guise of comity that tracks the critique of feminist tolerance we describe here, see Ralf Michaels, Empagran’s Empire: International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the U.S. Supreme Court of the Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 533 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011).
However, although conflicts is often associated with comity in the abstract, see Donald Earl
Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 15 (2010), doctrinal conflicts analysis actually rarely turns on comity
arguments. Conflicts rather addresses such concerns through other more technical doctrinal
means such as an analysis of the extent to which deferral to another state’s law might serve
the policy goal of “maintenance of interstate and international order.” See Robert A. Leflar,
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One doctrinal marker of the conflicts alternative to toleration discussed earlier is the public policy exception. As we indicated, the doctrines of conflicts
are invoked always with the awareness that what we term an ethical moment
must come to pass: the decisionmaker must decide whether to stand by the results of doctrine or to disregard them. But if this option is always on the table, it
is refined, limited, and postponed.
Again, conflicts’ seeming lack of awareness of the wider political and theoretical imperatives at stake in a choice between normative systems makes it a
refreshing alternative to the tolerance that Brown and Minow cogently describe
as an orientation that, while well-intentioned, often slips into its own form of
self-righteousness.
3. No compromise
A third thread that runs through much of the feminism/culture debate is the
search for the perfectly calibrated middle ground. Many public law doctrines
for thinking about the accommodation of feminism and multiculturalism explicitly deploy frameworks such as balancing tests that turn this normative imperative into a methodology. Here, the idea is that it is the job of the scholar,
judge, or policymaker to find the perfectly calibrated balance between opposing
interests, to split the baby precisely in two, to find the sweet spot at which all
sides give up precisely appropriate amounts in favor of the common good. Recall, for example, Shachar’s slicing of jurisdiction between the minority and the
state so as to transform culture from within over time by “equipping members
with means of combating unjust internal restrictions.”247 Some conflicts scholars have advocated similar approaches to conflicts.248
These approaches are clearly well-intended. But as Carol Greenhouse argues about this “discourse of solutions,” it also inadvertently sets the liberal
state up as the arbiter of the middle ground.249 As Prabha Kotiswaran further
suggests, there is both a lack of theoretical rigor and a certain arrogance, a seduction toward “governance mode,”250 in this search for the middle ground—a
sense that it is the scholar’s or policymaker’s privilege and duty to find the balance point, as if we scholars and policymakers were not already invested in one
Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 285-87 (1966).
In contrast, comity is an active doctrine in public international law. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987).
247. SHACHAR, supra note 77, at 14.
248. See, e.g., Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 203; Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, supra note 203; see also Minow & Singer, supra note 202.
249. See CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, THE PARADOX OF RELEVANCE: ETHNOGRAPHY AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 142, 170-73 (2011).
250. See Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the
International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and
Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 335, 410-11 (2006).
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side or the other, as if we came to the table without our own normative commitments built in. And as a practical matter, the proliferation of such proposals
suggests the difficulty—dare we say the impossibility—of finding such middle
ground. Here again, while conflict of laws does not oppose compromise as an
end result—after all, decisional harmony is sometimes mentioned as an important goal of all conflicts decisions—it does not explicitly seek it.
B. Feminism in the Conflicts Style
In light of the problems with proposals to find the middle ground, what we
find appealing about the conflicts approach is the adherence to the constraints
of technical form, with all its faux, tongue-in-cheek depoliticization of the issues.251 Rather than opening up all the politics and choosing a middle way,
conflicts methodologies actually point away from substance for a moment.
It is an oblique response, but again one that we believe institutionalizes into a practice a strong form of recognition of one’s own situatedness in the conflicts at issue. The conflicts judge has no illusions of being above the fray; she
entertains no ambition to choose an objective middle ground. She refuses that
task—but she does not refuse to reach a legal conclusion. Again, in contrast
with Shachar’s proposal, the conflicts move we call “slicing” is effectuated in a
far less instrumental modality.252 Conflicts, too, slices the problem down, recognizing that one normative system might trump for some purposes, and
another might trump for other purposes. But the aim is not to transform the other system. It is rather to resolve the technical question of what law applies to
the case at hand.
The appeal of the “as if” modality already has a strong feminist pedigree.
The postmodern feminist political philosopher Rosi Braidotti has described her
approach to philosophy as an “as if” modality of theorization, akin to inhabiting
a nomadic identity.253 She argues that this “as if” modality can be a tool for
opening up transformative possibilities:
It is as if some experiences were reminiscent or evocative of others; this ability to flow from one set of experiences to another is a quality of interconnectedness that I value highly. . . . [N]omadic becoming is neither reproduction
nor just imitation, but rather emphatic proximity, intensive interconnectedness.
Some states or experiences can merge simply because they share certain
attributes.254

251. It will be apparent that for this reason, unlike some other progressive conflicts
scholars, we prefer those conflicts methodologies—traditional and modern—that constrain
and limit the issues to those that open up the issues and face their politics head on.
252. As noted earlier, another important distinction is that Shachar is slicing jurisdiction
and not choice of law. See supra notes 77-78, 178-79, 247, and accompanying text.
253. See ROSI BRAIDOTTI, NOMADIC SUBJECTS: EMBODIMENT AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
IN CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THEORY (1994).
254. Id. at 5-6.
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Her discussion of the counterintuitive possibilities that inhere in turning
away from the “real” help to articulate what legal technique has to offer philosophy. For her, the “as if” of the nomadic legal subject
allows me to think through and move across established categories and levels
of experience: blurring boundaries without burning bridges. Implicit in my
choice is the belief in the potency and relevance of the imagination, of mythmaking, as a way to step out of the political and intellectual stasis of these
postmodern times. Political fictions may be more effective, here and now, than
theoretical systems.255

The “as if” also has strong proponents among both theorists of culture and
feminist theorists who have struggled with the question of what an ethical representational politics might look like. Since the work of Edmund Leach,256
Vaihinger has gained a following among generations of anthropologists searching for ways of responding to critiques of representation in that field. The anthropologist and cultural theorist Roy Wagner, for example, has described Vaihinger’s “as if” as the basis for cultural description after postmodernism: “A
relative perspective within the province of cultural construction, taking the referentialism of the symbol, the ‘is’ of convention, as a kind of subjunctive, is to
enter a tentative suspension—Vaihinger’s world of ‘as if.’”257
The feminist anthropologist Marilyn Strathern points out that the epistemological openness and ambivalence of the “as if”—whether in ritual practice or
in ethnographic writing—is enabled by a rigidity at the level of form.258 That
is, people substitute agreement about “the truth” with agreement to act or argue
or sing or dress or analyze or write according to a very specific set of aesthetic
criteria. The analogue to legal technique concerns the way one might embrace
the ambiguity of legal argumentation while still conforming carefully to the criteria of what constitutes a good argument—rather than, say, abandoning legal
argumentation altogether for policy arguments, or for that matter, political
theory arguments, poetry, or political demonstrations in the streets. In a later
work, Strathern specifically describes legal tools as “non-epistemological”
knowledge: legal technique, in her view, is knowledge that self-consciously
does not describe the world but rather serves as a “tool” within that world.259 In
our view, this “non-epistemological” or nonrepresentational quality of the “as
if” of legal technique—the way it papers over description—is a crucial element
of its transformative power.

255. Id. at 4.
256. See E.R. LEACH, POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA: A STUDY OF KACHIN

SOCIAL STRUCTURE 285 (2d ed. 1964).
257. ROY WAGNER, SYMBOLS THAT STAND FOR THEMSELVES 9 (1986).
258. See STRATHERN, supra note 236, at 180-81.
259. See MARILYN STRATHERN, KINSHIP, LAW AND THE UNEXPECTED: RELATIVES ARE
ALWAYS A SURPRISE 111 (2005) (noting “the role played by legal technique in the fabrication
of persons and things”).
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This subtle epistemological and ethical stance is quite different from the
more totalizing and directly instrumental feminist initiatives we have termed
dialogue, tolerance, and compromise. But it is also different, we believe, from
projects that have been our own in the past—attempts to describe the conflicts
between feminism and culture in ever more fine-grained contextual or hybridic
analyses, for example, or the choice to simply “take a break” from feminism.
From the point of view of feminism as technique, all these approaches share a
certain head-on and up-front way of addressing their problems, and hence a
great ethical and epistemological burden to “get it right”—something quite distinct from the more oblique and “for the moment” approach of the “as if.”
Again, we want to emphasize that just because the conflicts perspective rejects the authority to define the middle ground does not mean that the decisionmaker has carte blanche to ignore difference, dismiss all attempts to reach
out beyond one’s own values and vocabularies as a liberal fantasy, and settle
into a bubble of postmodern legalism in which one safely asserts that the “other” is unknowable anyway and so why bother. In other words, we want to reject
the false choice between technocratic managerialism on the one hand and legal
chauvinism or ironic cynicism on the other. Rather, as we have explained, we
view the constraint of form as an improbable, but ultimately powerful tool of
political engagement, one that preserves curiosity by allowing for the unexpected and the surprising in the midst of the legal mundane.
CONCLUSION
In Germany, France, Britain, and many other societies, the state’s multiculturalism policies have become a political flashpoint. Often, what ignites proposals for rollback takes the form of a defense of women. Much the same is
true in foreign policy debates about the rights of women abroad. If feminism
has become the bête noire of multiculturalism, the opposite is also true. As we
described in Part II, the problem of culture—of the very concept itself—has
mired feminist theory and practice in circles of debate and counterdebate. If the
political mainstream is concentrated on l’affaire du foulard, girls who vanish
from school in Britain to be married off in their family’s homeland, or synagogue windows in Montreal overlooking a women’s gym260—if President Bush
included “saving Afghan women” among the justifications for U.S. military ac-

260. See GÉRARD BOUCHARD & CHARLES TAYLOR, CONSULTATION COMM’N ON
ACCOMMODATION PRACTICES RELATED TO CULTURAL DIFFERENCES, BUILDING THE FUTURE:
A TIME FOR RECONCILIATION 53 (2008). The creation of Quebec’s Consultation Commission
on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences was prompted by hot-button
social issues in the province of Quebec, many of which involved women and religion. The
contentious questions included whether a Montreal YMCA had to install frosted windows in
its gym to prevent young boys and teenagers studying at the synagogue across the street
from having a full view of the women exercising. See id. at 45-60.
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tion in Afghanistan after 9/11261—academic feminism in the West seems to be
disoriented, even exhausted, in part by multiculturalism.
And yet, the problems do not go away. The failure of societies to reconcile
their commitments to gender equality and respect for cultural difference has
profound consequences for many women’s lives, and also threatens to become
an increasing source of tension in those societies. At the same time, the academic downward spiral we have described surrounding feminism/culture analysis has its own consequences. As feminist legal scholars, this issue matters to us
personally as well as professionally. Simply put, we want to live in an academic world in which feminist legal theory once again engages our passions and
aspirations. In short, the crisis around feminism/culture theory matters practically, politically, and theoretically.
This Article began by broadening the scope of the debate, showing by example that unlikely issues of private law, not commonly coded as either feminist or cultural, can raise the same complications of culture for feminism. Next,
the Article found help in a similarly unlikely place: the legal technicalities at
work in conflict of laws. Understood as we suggest, the subtle ethical positioning of the conflicts method, effectuated all along in a particular technical aesthetic style, offers new energy and opportunity to the feminism/culture quagmire. Its very different orientation towards cultural conflict helps us to
appreciate and advance the strengths of the debate. But conflicts also illuminates the limitations of the taken-for-granted orientations to the problem in feminist theory that we referred to as dialogue, tolerance, and compromise.
A close look at the intellectual moves at the heart of conflicts doctrines
suggests that many of these moves are quite avant-garde relative to the state of
critical and cultural theory. We showed how some of these doctrines take into
account and amplify some of the cutting-edge insights of feminist cultural
theory. For example, the very existence of the field of conflict of laws is a reminder of the fact that other frameworks for understanding gender and culture
exist on par with our own.
We also showed how some of the moves of conflicts as a field actually go
beyond the current state of critical and cultural theory and suggest new avenues
for thinking about feminism/culture problems. One example is conflicts’ signal
move of slicing issue by issue the question of which value system should govern. While feminists who employ contextualism or practical reasoning, for instance, would also refuse to join the politicians in endless debates about headscarves and child marriage in general, a conflicts sensibility is distinctive in
moving to a narrow and technical conversation about the appropriateness of
this headscarf as concerns this school and this girl at this moment. Slicing separates the areas of disagreement and agreement and thus opens up the possibility
261. See, e.g., Ann Russo, The Feminist Majority Foundation’s Campaign to Stop
Gender Apartheid, 8 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 557, 558, 560-62 (2006) (quoting from various
addresses by President George W. Bush and First Lady Laura Bush).
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of dealing with each separately. Likewise, the sequenced coupling of a deep
commitment to the recognition of relativist concerns with what we have termed
an ethical moment—a final analytical moment of decision and closure—takes
us beyond both muddled debates about the complexity of representation on the
one hand and well-intentioned but ultimately somewhat arrogant assertions of
the primacy of one’s own feminist ethical values on the other.
Some of the techniques we have described are not unique to conflicts; they
are part of the private law toolbox. Our interest in private law methodology
echoes but also advances a growing interest among specialists of international
law, legal pluralism, and globalization in private law.262 In our view, what ultimately defines private law is not a particular rapport with economic transactions, or a particular distance from administrative practice, or a link to the authority and legitimacy of market forces relative to the state, but rather a
particular set of techniques.263 And although to our knowledge we are the first
to explore the implications of legal technique for the feminism/culture debate,264 our analysis joins a growing interest in legal technique in areas of law
more traditionally associated with market relations.265
Yet in conflicts these tools take on a particular valence. They become
ways of grasping a wider conversation about overlapping and contested sovereignties, about how to talk about culture after the critiques of essentialism,
about how to conceptualize agency and power without falling into methodological individualism,266 about the linkages, overlaps, and proximities between political positions and also the points of disconnect. Technique, in short, can
sometimes be a way of getting at the political in a way that theorizing cannot
do. Our larger aim in this Article has been to suggest how the constraints of
technical legal form might open up new ethical, transformative, and interpretive
possibilities for legal theory.
262. See, e.g., GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010); JAMES THUO GATHII,
WAR, COMMERCE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther
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